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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the rationale for mixed-income approaches to affordable housing development, 
as well as the record of such developments in meeting their objectives, from the perspective of 
housing developers and those responsible for designing housing programs and policies. The drivers of 
the recent, renewed emphasis on a mixed-income housing projects are also examined and analyzed.  
The potential benefits this mixed-income approaches are summarized based on existing literature and 
interviews with key informants.  Overall, this paper finds mixed-income approaches can have an 
important role in getting additional affordable units built, ensuring high-quality housing, and 
deconcentrating poverty. However, mixed-income housing is not a silver bullet to overcoming the 
difficult challenges faced by families seeking to escape from poverty or the realities of housing 
markets. Because mixed-income developments are complex, present unique risks, and often house 
fewer needy families than other types of development, mixed-income approaches must carefully 
consider the local housing market, the population to be served, financing options, the scale of the 
project, and the community context. This paper concludes by discussing the implications of these 
findings and suggests guiding questions for developers and policy makers considering mixed-income 
projects and policies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Mixed-income housing is increasingly becoming a preferred model among academics, policy makers 
and practitioners for developing affordable housing. To support this growing interest, changes have 
been implemented in recent years at the federal, state and local levels to promote mixed-income 
housing, and prominent advocates, such as the Millennial Housing Commission, are calling for more 
mixed-income programs. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI 
program is a notable example of this approach, having allocated $4.5 billion over 10 years for the 
demolition and redevelopment of distressed public-housing projects into mixed-income housing 
developments.  
 
Despite this renewed emphasis on including a mix of incomes in affordable developments, relatively 
little research has been conducted to substantiate claims that mixed-income housing per se leads to 
positive benefits for low-income families. By examining past research and conducting interviews with 
developers, property managers and financiers of mixed-income housing, this paper seeks to offer a 
more nuanced framework for discussing the different types of mixed-income developments, their 
objectives, and a preliminary assessment of mixed-income housing’s record in meeting its objectives. 
 
Drivers of Policy 
Why is a mixed-income approach being adopted, and what do developers and policy makers hope to 
achieve? One reason for the growing popularity of a mixed-income approach is the higher incidence 
of crime, unemployment and other social ills found within high-poverty neighborhoods and public-
housing developments. In theory, mixed-income developments can reduce the incidence of social ills 
while providing an opportunity for low-income households to gain access to better neighborhoods, to 
network and to build relationships with higher-income families. Another motivation is the poor 
quality that many associate with subsidized housing. By including market-rate units, developers 
should be forced to build and maintain a high-quality housing development. Finally, a mixed-income 
approach is viewed as a means of alleviating the nation’s severe shortage of affordable housing. 
Including market-rate units might potentially reduce the subsidies needed for affordable units while 
overcoming protests against low-income housing in many communities. 
 
Mixes, Motivations and Markets 
Mixed-income developments vary greatly depending upon the same factors as any other housing 
development: population served, location, tenure type, management and scale. Most importantly, the 
mix of incomes within the developments varies greatly. In large part, the market determines what mix 
of incomes is possible. In addition, different mixed-income developments and funding programs give 
higher priority to different goals, which also shapes the income mix. Thus, a combination of the 
market and the priority given to the goals results in the mix of incomes served.  
 
The wide range of mixed-income developments may generally be thought of as falling on a scale 
where properties take on an identity that is closer or further away from being a true market-rate 
property. Within that scale, there are at least five different categories of mixed-income properties. 
 
Moderate-Income Inclusion: Predominately market-rate developments that include units for 
moderate-income households. 
 
 Low-Income Inclusion: Predominately market-rate developments that include units for low-
income households. 
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Broad Range of Incomes: Serves market-rate, moderate-income or low-income households, and 
extremely low-income households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market-Rate Inclusion: Predominately low-income developments that include market-rate units. 
Affordable Mix: Serves moderate- or low-income and extremely low-income households. 
Key Findings 
The success in and/or necessity of mixed-income developments meeting their key objectives varies 
greatly by geography, demographics, market and developer. Some of the common findings about 
affordable-housing developments’ success in meeting the three primary motivations are: 
 
Alleviating Concentrations of Poverty 
There is more evidence to support the importance of living in a healthy, mixed-income com-
munity in breaking the cycle of poverty than simply living in an isolated mixed-income develop-
ment. Such a development may have an important role in achieving a healthy neighborhood; 
however, other housing strategies may prove to be more effective. 
There is little evidence that tenants in mixed-income developments interact in a meaningful way, 
limiting any potential social benefits. 
Property managers now apply strict screening and management practices regardless of the mix of 
incomes, greatly curtailing the incidence of negative social behavior.  
 
Producing High-Quality Developments 
Market pressure is the most reliable force in guaranteeing high standards. However, most sub-
sidized housing is in good condition, and community pressure in particular can be a powerful 
force in ensuring high standards, regardless of the mix of incomes. 
 
Meeting the Shortage of Affordable Units 
Generally, mixed-income developments do not lessen the subsidy needed. Only in a few very 
tight housing markets is a cross-subsidy possible, and only for developers with low return 
thresholds. In weak markets and transitional neighborhoods, additional investments must be made 
to attract higher-income households.  
A mixed-income approach does appear to be effective in overcoming political and community 
barriers to moving a project forward. It is unclear if a mixed-income approach will build future 
political support for affordable housing. 
 
Implications 
A mixed-income approach can have an important role in getting additional affordable units built, 
ensuring high-quality housing, and deconcentrating poverty. However, it either need not, or cannot, 
be relied upon to achieve all of these goals. Mixed-income housing is not a silver bullet to over-
coming the difficult challenges faced by families seeking to escape from poverty or the realities of the 
housing market. Thus it is essential to be clear about what a developer or policymaker is trying to 
achieve. Because mixed-income developments are almost always more complex, present unique risks, 
and often house fewer needy families, this approach should not be casually adopted. Careful con-
sideration of factors, such as the condition of the housing market, population to be served, financing, 
number of units and community context, must be evaluated before deciding if mixed-income housing 
is needed or appropriate, and what mix of incomes is feasible.  
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I. MIXED-INCOME HOUSING: A RENEWED ROLE 
“We risk a societal collapse by the first decade of the next century if we tolerate racism and the 
economic isolation of millions of people,” former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros warned in 1993.1 
While dramatic, his statement underscores the barriers that the physical and social isolation of poor 
families presents to breaking the cycle of poverty. As a result of this realization, the economic inte-
gration of poor families has become a key goal of our nation’s housing policy. Policies promoting 
integration have come in two forms: dispersal, helping extremely low-income families move into 
middle-class neighborhoods; and, mixed-income housing, which includes households of various 
incomes within the same housing development. The focus of this paper is on the latter strategy, 
mixed-income developments, which are becoming a preferred strategy for developing affordable 
housing.  
 
Although not a new idea, the mixed-income approach has become a key element of HUD’s recent 
public-housing policy. It is also a concept supported by many states and localities, and is a common 
model for nonprofit or mission-based housing developers. Despite this widespread support, there is a 
wide variation in how “mixed-income” is defined. Various definitions stipulate a specific mix of 
incomes, the inclusion of market-rate2 units, or the presence of working families.3 In fact, mixed-
income developments are extremely diverse. They include many different types of income mixes, are 
located in a range of markets, offer both home-ownership and rental opportunities, and ultimately 
have different objectives for the development. The lack of a definitive description and set of objec-
tives makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of mixed-income programs and the sensibility of 
such a policy. Nevertheless, as the popularity of a mixed-income approach grows, a critical 
examination of its goals and success in meeting them is required to determine its appropriate role in 
meeting the nation’s housing needs. 
 
New Emphasis on an Old Idea 
The favor given to mixed-income housing by policymakers has waxed and waned over the years. The 
evolution of public housing is one example of this phenomenon. During the 1940s and 1950s, public 
housing generally served a range of upwardly mobile, working families. Over time, public housing 
came to predominantly house a population that was extremely poor and less upwardly mobile. The 
same forces of cheap suburban homes, highway construction and economic changes that led to the 
flight of middle-class, white families from urban areas also led to the concentration of extremely 
poor, minority families in public housing. Schizophrenic policy changes also helped to facilitate this 
transition. The Brooke Amendment of 1969 eliminated a minimum rent and stipulated that tenants 
pay no more than 25 percent of their income for rent. This made public housing more affordable to 
the extremely poor. To prevent the concentration of lower-income tenants, Congress passed a law in 
1974 that directed public housing authorities to “include families with a broad range of incomes.” 
However, this regulation was trumped by a 1981 law that limited Section 8 and public-housing 
tenancy almost exclusively to households with incomes below 50 percent of area median income 
                                                          
1 Nyden, Lukehart, Maly and Peterman, 1998, p. 4. 
2 Through this paper, the term “market-rate” refers to housing units without limits on the incomes of the resi-
dents. “Market-rate rent” is the amount of rent that can be charged for such units on the market. These will often 
be lower than “construction rents” or the rents necessary to justify new construction. 
3 Brophy and Smith offer a definition of mixed-income housing as “a deliberate effort to construct and/or own a 
multifamily development that has a mixing of groups as a fundamental part of its financial and operating plans.” 
Brophy and Smith, 1997, p. 5. 
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(AMI).4 In 1997, the average annual income of public-housing tenants was $8,900, and only five 
percent earned more than $20,000 per year. 
 
One federal program that directly encouraged mixed-income housing was the 80/20 Bond Program 
that permitted local governments and state agencies to sell tax-exempt bonds to finance developments 
that reserved 20 percent of the units for rental to families that met Section 8 eligibility requirements 
(80 percent of AMI).5 However, this program was discontinued in 1986. A number of HUD-funded 
properties have also become mixed-income without special stipulations. By one count, 1,136 (12.3 
percent) of HUD’s multifamily properties had a significant mix of incomes.6 Some states and 
localities, notably Massachusetts and New York City, also have had financing programs to facilitate 
mixed-income developments in place since the 1970s that are still in effect.  
 
As a substantial body of research emerged documenting the negative impacts of concentrations of 
poverty, a mixed-income approach began to reemerge as a promising means of alleviating these 
negative effects.7 While some of the boldest steps have been taken in federal public-housing pro-
grams, the approach is gaining favor at all levels of government. Some of the most notable recent 
steps in promoting mixed-income housing are described below.  
 
 
                                                          
Federal Programs and Legislation 
 
 Low Income Housing Tax Credit (1986): The nation’s largest affordable-housing production 
program, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, allows developers to commit as few as 20 to 
40 percent of their units for low-income tenants. These low requirements for the inclusion of 
low-income households were designed to promote mixed-income developments. In addition, 
because the rent level is not fixed as a percent of income, families were encouraged to remain 
in the development even if their incomes rose. However, because the subsidy allocated is 
based on the number of affordable units, it is usually more financially appealing for the 
developer to include all income-qualified units. Only 18 percent of the tax-credit properties 
include market-rate units.8  
 
 Family Self-Sufficiency Program (1990): This program seeks to develop a mixed-income 
property by raising the incomes of existing public-housing and Section 8 tenants. Families 
receive case-management services to identify employment goals and access supportive 
services in the community needed to meet the goals. Typically, families must pay 30 percent 
of any additional earnings in rent to the public housing authority. However, through this 
program the PHA deposits any increase in rent into an escrow account for the family 
members to help them develop savings. At present, fewer than half of all PHAs offer this 
program, and less than 5 percent of eligible families with children participate.9 
 
4 The new Section 16 of the 1937 Housing Act “limits Section 8 and public-housing occupancy by tenants other 
than those of very low income (50 percent of area median for a family of four) to 25 percent of the units under 
subsidy contracts as of October 1, 1981, which become vacant after that date and 5 percent of the units which 
first become available after October 1, 1981.” Jacobs, Harney, Edson and Lane, 1986, p. 63. 
5 Jacobs, Harney, Edson and Lane, 1986. 
6 Of these properties, 784 were 100-percent subsidized but had either a range of incomes or a majority of the 
tenants have very low incomes and work. Khadduri and Martin, 1997. 
7 See discussion on “Adverse Effects of Concentrations of Poverty” in Section II.  
8 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Assessment of the Economic and Social Characteristics of 
LIHTC Residents and Neighborhoods, 2000.  
9 Sard, 2001. 
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 Mixed-Income New Communities (1990): This HUD demonstration program permitted 
between 25 and 50 percent of the units in a public-housing development to be leased to 
families with incomes of up to 80 percent of the area median income. In addition, housing 
authorities could lease up to 25 percent of the units in a privately owned property for public-
housing tenants.10 
 
 HOPE VI Revitalization Grants (1992): Focusing on the most distressed public-housing 
developments, HUD allocated a total of $4.55 billion from 1993 to 2002 to demolish 78,000 
units of public-housing and to transform these projects into mixed-income housing 
developments. Among the enabling rule changes were the elimination of federal preferences 
for admitting very-low-income households, and authorizing public-housing development 
funds and operating subsidies for projects owned by a private entity.11 
 
 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (1998): This legislation explicitly moves 
toward a mixed-income approach by requiring public-housing authorities to “bring higher-
incomes tenants into lower-income projects and lower-income tenants into higher-income 
projects.” The act also states that while 40 percent of households newly admitted to public 
housing must have incomes below 30 percent of the area median income, the rest of the units 
may be leased to households with incomes of up to 80 percent of AMI. 
 
 
 
                                                          
State LIHTC Allocations Policies: States are responsible for allocating their share of low-
income housing tax credits. To encourage more mixed-income developments, some states now 
give preference in the allocation of tax credits to developments that include market-rate units. 
Among the states that have adopted such an allocation strategy are Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey 
and Massachusetts. The preference for mixed-income developments was first introduced in 
Indiana in 1998, and 42 of 486 properties now include market-rate units.12 The preference was 
introduced in Massachusetts in 1995, and about 200 out of 350 properties now include market-
rate units.13 
 
Local Zoning and Planning Regulations: While the financing powers of localities are more 
limited, many now encourage mixed-income housing through zoning and regulations. For 
example, the city of Raleigh, North Carolina, limits the number of affordable units that the city 
will fund in one development, often resulting in the inclusion of market-rate units. Other munici-
palities use zoning laws to require that developers include affordable units in market-rate 
developments. The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit program in Montgomery County Maryland, 
which offers an increase in allowable density for the inclusion of affordable units, is one of the 
most established programs, having been initiated in 1978. Local “inclusionary zoning” programs 
appear to be becoming more prevalent.14 
 
Future policy changes are likely to continue a shift in favor of mixed-income housing. The recently 
released report of the Millennial Housing Commission emphasizes that “mixed-income housing is 
generally preferable to affordable housing that concentrates and isolates poor families.”15 Recom-
mendations from the Commission, such as a new production program for mixed-income develop-
ments housing extremely low-income households, reflect this guiding principle. In addition, a recent 
10 Ceraso, 1995. 
11 Salama, 1999. See also, National Housing Law Project, 2002. 
12 E-mail correspondence with Rochelle Gilbert, August 29, 2002. 
13 E-mail correspondence with Michele Dick, July 22, 2002. 
14 Center for Housing Policy, 2000. 
15 Millennial Housing Commission, 2002. 
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report from the U.S. Conference of Mayors calls on federal programs to “place a high priority on 
achieving both mixed-income developments and mixed-income neighborhoods.”16 
 
Despite recent policy changes and the excitement surrounding mixed-income developments, most 
housing programs are not well designed to facilitate the financing of mixed-income developments. 
Some developers are finding ways to arrange the financing of mixed-income developments under 
federal programs, but many report that they are limited to financing all-low-income developments. 
However, even those that cannot structure the financing report increasing political pressure to include 
a mix of incomes in their developments.17 
 
Goals of This Paper 
At first glance, a mixed-income approach seems like a common-sense idea that should be readily 
adopted. If the isolation of low-income families is a major problem, housing them with middle-class 
households within a development seems an ideal approach to promoting their social and economic 
integration. Despite the seemingly solid rationale, relatively little research has been conducted to 
substantiate claims that mixed-income housing developments per se can lead to positive benefits for 
poor families. Compiling evidence to definitively answer the question of the effectiveness of mixed-
income housing is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, by examining past research and conducting 
interviews with developers, property managers and financiers of mixed-income housing, this paper 
seeks to offer a more nuanced framework for discussing the different types of mixed-income 
developments, their objectives, and a preliminary assessment of mixed-income housing’s record in 
meeting its objectives. 
 
Toward this end, the starting point of this paper is to explore what forces have made mixed-income 
housing such an attractive option to policymakers. One force clearly is a general perception that past 
approaches have failed and that the mixed-income approach offers more promise. However, the fail-
ure of past approaches can be overstated and blur the discussion about what unique goals mixed-
income housing is trying to achieve. Thus, this paper will seek to define the specific goals of mixed-
income housing prior to assessing its record in achieving these goals. Also, because mixed-income 
developments have such wide variation in their mix of incomes, the goals and achievements of 
various mixes will be examined. Based on these preliminary assessments, a number of key implica-
tions and questions for assessing the need for a mixed-income approach are offered. This paper also 
seeks to present more evidence and clarify the goals and implications of various mixes. 
 
This paper does not attempt to offer best practices for future mixed-income developments. Nor does it 
offer recommendations to facilitate the financing of mixed-income developments through federal 
housing programs.18 These are important steps, but they are ancillary to the central questions of 
mixed-income housing’s goals and effectiveness that this paper seeks to address. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2002, p. 4. 
17 An informal survey of housing developers found that all faced increasing political pressure. The survey was 
taken in a discussion group arranged for this paper in San Francisco, August 5, 2002. 
18 Recommendations for changes to existing programs and new programs to facilitate the financing of mixed-
income developments can be found in the report of the Millennial Housing Commission, Meeting Our Nation’s 
Housing Challenges, 2002. 
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II. WHY DEVELOP MIXED-INCOME HOUSING? 
To a great extent, mixed-income housing has become a preferred means of developing affordable 
housing without a rigorous debate about what is to be accomplished via this approach. The rationale 
articulated by proponents sometimes consists of a vague reference to a better social situation in 
mixed-income developments, or a declaration that all-low-income public housing did not work. The 
favor given to mixed-income housing appears to be as much of a reaction to past housing efforts as it 
is an acceptance of the merits of this approach. This mix of reasoning can often confuse the debate on 
mixed-income housing. Thus, a sound analysis requires clarification of the following questions: 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
 
                                                          
What pre-existing conditions have prompted a shift to mixed-income housing? 
What are we seeking to accomplish through a mixed-income approach? 
 
Drivers of Policy 
The results of past housing programs, social conditions and policy changes all combined to signal that 
a new strategy is needed for addressing the nation’s affordable-housing problem. Mixed-income 
housing thus owes much of its resurgence to the following three factors: 
 
Adverse effects of concentrations of poverty, 
Poor perceived quality of subsidized housing, and 
Shortage of affordable housing. 
 
These factors represent the underlying problems to be addressed. Following from these factors is the 
perceived impact that mixed-income housing can have in addressing the problem. An assessment of 
mixed-income housing’s record in addressing these problems is offered in Section IV. 
 
1. Adverse Effects of Concentrations of Poverty 
The degree to which neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty proliferated due to the exo-
dus of middle-class families from urban areas is startling. In 1970, only one neighborhood in Chicago 
had a poverty rate of over 40 percent, but by 1980 that number had grown to nine. In the nation’s five 
largest cities, the number of poor families living in such neighborhoods grew by 182 percent during 
this time period.19 Bruce Katz of the Brooking Institution asserts that researchers have “found a direct 
correlation between these neighborhoods of high poverty and such key social indicators as declining 
school performance and relatively high rates of criminal activity, family fragmentation, substance 
abuse and teenage pregnancy.”20 Some of the key reports and findings for individuals living in 
neighborhoods with very high concentrations of poverty, particularly those with poverty rates of 
greater than 40 percent, include: 
 
Low School Performance: One study reports that when the percentage of high-status workers in 
a neighborhood fell below 5.6 percent, the dropout rates of African-American teenagers rose 
dramatically.21  
Low Earnings and Employment Levels: One study found that at least one quarter of the gap in 
education and earnings of African-American men due to background differences can be 
accounted for by differences in neighborhood quality.22 
19 Wilson, 1987. 
20 Katz, 1999, p. 3. 
21 Crane, 1991. 
22 Datcher, 1992. 
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 
 
                                                          
High Teenage Pregnancy Rates: A review of empirical research found that almost all studies 
indicate a negative relationship between neighborhood poverty levels and sexual activity or 
pregnancy among adolescents.23 
High Incidence of Crime: Studies indicate a strong association between violence and low 
neighborhood socioeconomic status.24 
 
Several theories exist as to why these negative factors grow more prevalent in communities with high 
concentrations of poverty, and why it is more difficult to break a cycle of poverty in such circum-
stances. One reason is that fewer opportunities exist in high-poverty communities to encourage skill 
development and income growth. Schools are often poor, local employment opportunities are scarce, 
and community institutions are weak or nonexistent. Other poverty researchers place additional 
emphasis on the social effects of economic isolation. William Julius Wilson argues that social 
isolation of residents of high-poverty areas constrains their access to job networks, marriageable 
partners and exposure to conventional role models.25 “Ghetto-specific culture is a response to these 
structural constraints and limited opportunities.”26 Other researchers, such as Oscar Lewis, have 
asserted that the negative behaviors of poor persons in high-poverty areas are not only a response to 
their environment, but represent an endemic culture of poverty, “passed down from generation to 
generation.”27 While the role of social and strictly economic factors in perpetuating a cycle of poverty 
can be debated, the underlying finding is clear that families residing in high-poverty areas face a 
tremendously difficult path to escaping poverty. 
 
Also troubling has been the role of U.S. housing policy in reinforcing these concentrations of poverty. 
Many high-density, multifamily public-housing developments were sited in neighborhoods that 
already had high levels of poverty, and created an influx of very-low-income tenants. Often this was 
due to the objections of higher-income neighborhoods to siting the developments there, making low-
income neighborhoods the only politically feasible sites to build the housing. As of 1997, the average 
neighborhood poverty rate of public-housing projects was 37 percent.28 Rather than acting as stabil-
izing forces, many developments instead contributed to the problems of the neighborhood. For 
example, of the 1,251 households in the Cabrini-Green development in Chicago in 1996, only seven 
percent of the tenants worked, 90 percent were on public assistance, and the average income was 
$6,000.29 In this setting, violent crime became rampant, leading one of the parks in the development 
to be nicknamed “the killing field.” While most public-housing developments actually provide fair-
quality housing, such extreme examples produced a “widely held stereotype…of notorious housing 
developments in overly concentrated, distressed neighborhoods — poorly designed and managed, 
starved of social and recreational facilities, and isolated from economic opportunities.”30  
 
In reaction to the abject conditions found in both neighborhoods and public-housing developments 
with high concentrations of poverty, many policymakers have concluded that these concentrations 
must be broken up at all costs. The boldest step in this direction, and the one with the most resources, 
has been the HOPE VI program administered by HUD. From 1993 to 2002, $4.55 billion in grants 
have been awarded to public-housing authorities to demolish distressed public-housing units and 
replace them with new units that are better integrated into the surrounding neighborhood, serve 
households with a broader range of incomes, and are supported by additional social services and on-
23 Turner and Ellen, 1997. 
24 Short, 1997; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981. 
25 Wilson, 1987, p. 61. 
26 Ibid., p. 137. 
27 Katz, 1989, p. 17. 
28 HUD, 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Quick Facts, 1997. 
29 Salama, 1999. 
30 Abravanel, Smith and Turner, 1998. 
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site facilities. Public-housing authorities have the option of replacing all of the demolished units, but 
most opt to provide vouchers for some percentage of the displaced tenants instead. The goal of these 
developments is to create a mixed-income community that lacks the social ills of the prior 
development.  
 
HUD’s Moving to Opportunity and Chicago’s Gautreaux program focus on moving residents out of 
high-poverty neighborhoods, rather than creating mixed-income developments in their place. Partici-
pants are offered a variety of support services in addition to rental assistance to facilitate a move from 
a high-poverty to low-poverty community. The initial findings of the Gautreaux program demonstrate 
positive results, indicating increased employment among parents as well as higher test scores and 
college attendance among children.31 Such findings lend support to the importance of healthy 
neighborhoods in breaking a cycle of poverty, and add momentum to the concept of mixed-income 
developments, particularly those sited in low-poverty neighborhoods. 
  
What Can Mixed-Income Housing Accomplish In Theory? 
The Moving to Opportunity strategy demonstrates the merits of moving individual residents from a 
high-poverty area to a low-poverty one. Some mixed-income developments essentially accomplish 
the same thing by enabling low-income households to live in neighborhoods in which they could not 
otherwise afford to live. In this situation, the potential benefits are primarily derived from the 
community in which the development is located. The greater challenge for mixed-income strategies is 
to produce significant benefits in developments that are in neighborhoods that either have high levels 
of poverty or lack good schools and employment opportunities. What can a mixed-income housing 
development hope to accomplish in such an environment? 
 
a. Manage Negative Behavior 
By mixing households of various incomes within a housing development, it is hoped that the social 
ills found in many public-housing projects and high-poverty neighborhoods can be avoided. This 
reasoning applies most directly to the idea that there is a “culture of poverty” that must be broken. 
Very poor adults and their children may be less likely to engage in negative behavior if higher-
income families are present. Crime is less likely to be tolerated by the higher-income tenants residing 
in the development. In addition, children may adopt more of the “mainstream values” of their higher-
income neighbors, and postpone childbearing or place greater emphasis on education. The inclusion 
of families who work regardless of income may be a key factor in avoiding the social problems of 
concentrated-poverty housing development. A “culture of work” may thus be created at the housing 
development.32  
 
b. Offer More Life Chances 
In addition to reducing negative social behavior, mixed-income housing might lead to positive “life 
chances” for low-income families via interaction with higher-income families. As one author asserts, 
higher-income tenants are more likely to be “well-adjusted citizens who can serve as role models for 
lower-income tenants, helping them to become more self-sufficient and less dependent upon the 
public dole.”33 In addition to creating a “culture of work,” interaction between residents may serve to 
create informal job networks. The benefits from such a network might apply both to nonworking 
households in need of employment and to working households in search of better employment. 
However, high levels of social interaction are clearly needed to produce such networks.  
                                                          
31 Rosenbaum, 1995. 
32 Khadduri and Martin, 1997. 
33 Jacobs et al., 1986, p. 63. 
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Children may benefit from exposure to working families as well as households with high-stature jobs. 
Even without significant interaction, the presence of families with various types of employment may 
at least suggest to children a range of opportunities that would not be apparent in a development with 
a concentration of poverty. High levels of interaction may also produce working role models that 
could have a significant impact on the children’s lives. Some evidence suggests that children who do 
not have exposure to working-adult role models will have difficulty finding and sustaining employ-
ment as adults.34 Because interaction between children is more likely than between adult residents, 
there is a greater chance of significant interaction and positive benefits for children. 
 
This discussion of social benefits centers largely upon working-age adults and children. In fact, 
elderly residents (over age 62) comprise 33 percent of all households receiving a subsidy, and the 
majority of households for project-based Section 8 properties.35 A mixed-income property may thus 
be achieved with either a mix of low- and high-income elderly residents, or working-age households 
with low-income elderly residents. Developments that rely upon elderly households to achieve their 
mix of incomes are unlikely to produce more life chances, because these households are unlikely to 
either be working or to have dependent children residing with them. 
 
c. Rebuild Healthy Communities 
Mixed-income housing also potentially can have a significant role in transforming a distressed neigh-
borhood into a healthy community that is home to households with a wider range of incomes, has 
fewer social ills, and offers a higher quality of life. In a distressed community with a large number of 
vacant lots, the infusion of 500 attractive new townhouses may provide an impetus for the develop-
ment of new properties and upgrading the condition of existing ones. In transitional communities, the 
addition of attractive housing may help to stabilize a block or section of a neighborhood that is 
experiencing disinvestment. A mixed-income development that succeeds in attracting higher-income 
households that would otherwise not have considered living in that community may encourage 
additional higher-income households to live in the community.  
 
The combination of these factors can have a significant impact in attracting households of all incomes 
to this neighborhood. Additional households, particularly those with higher incomes, will attract new 
investment, new services and new jobs. These households may also have impacts in reducing crime, 
improving neighborhood schools, and bringing more political clout that can translate into better 
municipal services.36 The potential of this accomplishment speaks to the role of inadequate 
institutions and services in perpetuating cycles of poverty. 
 
2. Poor Perceived Quality of Subsidized Low-Income Housing 
A major problem associated with subsidized low-income housing in the U.S. is the perception of poor 
quality. Many of the problems begin with the design of the developments. A typical public-housing 
development consists of several high-rise buildings, built in a standardized, institutional design, and 
surrounded by open fields. Such a design leaves little private or “defensible” space, contributing to 
higher incidences of crime.37 Because this design looks different from surrounding homes, a stigma 
tends to be associated with such developments. Catherine Bauer asserts, “Each project proclaims, 
visually, that it serves the ‘lowest income group.’”38  
                                                          
34 Wilkins, 2001. 
35 HUD, 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Quick Facts, 1997. 
36 Wyly and Hammel, 1999. 
37 Newman, 1996. 
38 J. Paul Mitchell, Ed., Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present, 1985, p. 280. 
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The initial quality of many of the buildings was also poor. With limited funds to build as many units 
as possible, and to save money on future maintenance, corners were cut in construction. “Cost 
restrictions discouraged design features which were essential to the smooth function of families and 
of the projects as communities. Units with minimal floor space; elevators which stopped on every 
other floor; floor plans arranged to minimize costs but maximize security problems; a total absence of 
site planning or recreational facilities — all of these were seen as prudent cost-cutting measures.”39 
Finally, the resources needed to maintain the buildings properly were not available, causing many to 
fall into severe disrepair. As public housing began to serve the most needy families, the revenue from 
rent decreased. While HUD provided operating subsidies, they were not sufficient to cover all main-
tenance costs.40 In addition, much of the subsidized housing stock is 30 to 40 years old, and the 
normal effects of aging have added to the poor condition of the properties. Many subsidized housing 
developments, both publicly and privately owned and managed, became of such poor quality that they 
became virtually uninhabitable. For example, the vacancy rate in all properties managed by the 
Detroit PHA averaged 40 percent. In the Lafayette Courts development in Baltimore, the refusal rate 
of eligible tenants was 70 percent.41 
 
However, it is easy to overstate the degree of poor quality and design of both public housing and 
privately owned and managed subsidized housing. Many of the elements described above apply only 
to public housing. Furthermore, a survey conducted during 1998 and 1999 by HUD of its inventory of 
public and privately owned subsidized housing found that 82 percent of the properties inspected were 
in “good” or “excellent” condition. Only three percent were considered to be in “failing” condition.42 
However, such developments, while a small minority, tend to dominate the public’s perception of 
subsidized housing. Also, while a majority of the units are in good condition, many low-rise public-
housing units tend to look different from their surrounding environment. Thus, a stigma may still be 
attached to the development and the residents that they live in “low-income housing.”  
 
What Can Mixed-Income Housing Accomplish In Theory? 
A mixed-income approach can potentially provide both higher-quality units that lack any social 
stigma, and an incentive to maintain the development to a high standard. 
 
a. Develop High-Quality Units 
Mixed-income developments must attract tenants willing to pay market rents, instead of only tenants 
with few or no housing options. Because they must be marketed to and attract a population with more 
housing options, the development must be built to a high standard. This approach should be able to 
achieve a higher quality of housing than other subsidized housing. Most mixed-income funding 
programs require that the affordable units be similar in design and interspersed with the market-rate 
units. In addition, developers may be required to include amenities such as pools or fitness centers 
that benefit all residents. 
 
b. Maintain the Development to a High Standard 
Housing quality in affordable developments also suffers from the fact that many tenants simply have 
no other alternatives due to their low incomes. Thus, there is no incentive for private landlords to 
invest in maintenance. The inclusion of households that can afford other housing options, even if they 
are limited, imposes a burden upon the owner to both develop housing that is attractive and market-
                                                          
39 Hays, 1985, p. 97. 
40 Hays, p. 88. 
41 Fosburg, Popkin and Locke, 1996. 
42 HUD, A House in Order, 1999.  
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able and to maintain its quality. If it is not attractive, tenants will move elsewhere.43 Requirements 
that units for households of different incomes be interspersed may be a key component to keeping 
pressure on the management to maintain all units to a high standard. In addition to placing pressure 
on management, higher-income tenants may also be more likely to complain or place pressure on 
tenants who are not conforming to upkeep standards.  
 
The use of private financing in almost all mixed-income developments requires an additional degree 
of oversight in evaluating the feasibility of housing developments. Lenders and investors will not 
fund a project unless there are sufficient replacement and operating reserves. Of course, this principle 
also holds true for privately financed affordable-housing developments that do not have a significant 
mix of incomes, such as most LIHTC projects.  
 
3. Shortage of Affordable Housing 
There is a great shortage of affordable housing in the U.S., with 12.1 million households paying more 
than half of their income for rent. Households paying this level of rent are considered to be severely 
cost-burdened, as their high rent payments likely cause hardship in paying for other needed goods and 
services. The problem is particularly severe for households with incomes below 30 percent of AMI, 
as nearly eight million, or 53 percent of this group, are severely cost-burdened. While there may be 
disagreement over definitions of “needy” households with regards to housing, such numbers give at 
least a sense of the scale of the need. Table 1 shows the number of households by income group that 
are severely cost-burdened. 
 
Table 1. Severe Housing Burdens by Income Group44 
Owners Renters Total Households  
Income 
Categories All 
(1,000s) 
Severely 
Burdened 
(1,000s) 
All 
(1,000s) 
Severely 
Burdened 
(1,000s) 
All 
(1,000s) 
Severely 
Burdened 
(1,000s) 
Percent of 
Total 
Households 
Severely 
Burdened 
Extremely  
Low-Income  
(<30% AMI) 
6,410 3,175  8,513 4,798 14,923 7,973 53% 
Very-Low-
Income  
(30–50% AMI) 
7,138 1,151  6,243 1,121 13,381 2,272 17% 
Low-Income 
(50–80% AMI) 10,680  783  7,270  252 17,950 1,035 6% 
Moderate-
Income  
(80–120% AMI) 
14,284  465  6,681  93 20,965  558 3% 
High-Income 
(>120% AMI) 30,283  239  5,300  15 35,583  254 0.7% 
Total 68,795 5,813 34,007 6,279 102,802 12,092 12% 
 
However, public resources to meet this great need are woefully inadequate. Housing-production 
programs operate with very limited resources in comparison to the need. Funded at $4.1 billion 
                                                          
43 Increasing housing options is also a key reason for tenant-based, rather than project-based, Section 8 
vouchers. 
44 Millennial Housing Commission, 2002, data from Table 1. 
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annually, the LIHTC is now the largest production program, and has funded the construction of over 
one million units of affordable housing since its inception in 1986. In addition, direct housing 
assistance is provided to about 5 million households. However, this level of assistance only reaches 
one in three eligible households. One reason for the limited funding is a lack of public support for 
low-income housing programs. Public housing is the most visible of the nation’s housing programs, 
and it is safe to say it does not enjoy a favorable perception among the general public. In comparison, 
housing subsidies for middle- and upper-income families in the form of deductions for mortgage 
interest, property tax and capital gains enjoy broad support. These deductions total about $120 billion 
in reduced tax revenues, or roughly three times HUD’s budget.45 
Another barrier to meeting the nation’s housing needs is the objections that residents raise when 
affordable housing developments are proposed in their communities. Such objections, often referred 
to as NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard), are common to nearly every neighborhood. In affluent 
neighborhoods, many residents complain about the potential for lowered property values due to the 
construction of affordable housing. As noted earlier, much of the public associates affordable housing 
with the negative images of run-down, poorly designed and crime-ridden public-housing develop-
ments. This likely fuels a great deal of the backlash against locating low-income housing in many 
communities. Practitioners also report that many homeowners believe that their property values will 
suffer if lower-income households are allowed into their neighborhoods, regardless of the quality of 
the housing. The issue of race, and negative behaviors residents associate with a given race, are also 
delicately, or not so delicately, raised in many settings. As one observer has noted, “Being poor is a 
proxy for being minority and vice versa, and being either is a proxy for not wanting them in your 
neighborhood.”46 However, the issue of NIMBYism is not confined to affluent, predominantly white 
communities. Many of the strongest objections are found among residents of all races in predomi-
nantly low-income neighborhoods, particularly among low-income homeowners. Many object to 
proposed developments on the grounds that they already have more than their fair share of affordable 
housing.47  
 
Objections are not limited to housing for extremely low-income households either. Proposed housing 
for households at 50 to 60 percent of the median income draw the ire of residents as well. As Patricia 
Garrett of the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Housing Partnership in Charlotte, North Carolina, explains, 
“We have to do a lot of education that the housing is for people such as your bus drivers, teacher 
aides or librarians.”48 Such objections make the construction of new affordable housing extremely 
difficult, even with adequate funding. To counter such objections, the term “work-force housing” is 
often used to convey that working families are being served, rather nonworking families that may be 
reliant upon public assistance and engender more community resistance.  
 
What Can Mixed-Income Housing Accomplish In Theory? 
A mixed-income approach can potentially alleviate both the political and financial barriers to meeting 
the nation’s need for affordable housing. 
 
a. Develop Affordable Units With Less Public Subsidy 
Operating with limited funding to address the housing needs of low-income families, policymakers 
and developers have increasingly looked to new and creative means of leveraging private-sector 
resources to produce and preserve affordable housing. Programs have been created under the premise 
that with the right mix of incentives, the inclusion of market-rate units will allow developers to 
                                                          
45 Millennial Housing Commission, 2002, Table 8. 
46 Interview with Charles Buki, July 17, 2002. 
47 Interview with Jeanne Pinado, July 23, 2002. 
48 Interview with Patricia Garrett, July 15, 2002.  
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construct affordable units with a subsidy below that needed in 100-percent affordable developments, 
or that a subsidy can be provided in a form other than a direct public expenditure or tax reduction. 
Some notable examples of programs that have existed for many years include: 
 
The 80/20 programs in New York City and Massachusetts offer a shallow subsidy of tax-exempt, 
below-market financing to developers who make 20 percent of their units affordable to house-
holds earning less than 50 percent of AMI.  
 
 
 
The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit program in Montgomery County, Maryland, requires that 
residential developments of more than 50 units make at least 12.5 percent of the units affordable 
to moderate-income households. To offset the lost rent, developers receive a density bonus of up 
to 22 percent. The local PHA also has the option to purchase the affordable units, ensuring that 
they remain affordable in perpetuity. 
Public housing authorities and nonprofit developers can also take advantage of the concept of cross-
subsidization. If rents on the market-rate units are high enough, there is a potential to use the cash 
flow in excess of operating costs to subsidize the affordable units. Thus, in theory, less subsidy per 
affordable unit is needed.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of market rents may make a project more viable financially in the long 
term than affordable-housing developments that have a limit on rents that can be charged for all units. 
This will reduce the need for costly government bailouts of subsidized projects that fail to cover their 
operating costs. 
 
b. Assuage Community Concerns Over Affordable Housing (Overcome NIMBYism)  
Including a mix of incomes in an affordable development, particularly market-rate units, can be a way 
to assuage community concerns. Residents concerned that a development will come to resemble a 
troubled public-housing project in both the appearance of the property and the behavior of tenants, 
may be more willing to accept a development that includes higher-income families. This may be 
particularly important in attempting to locate affordable housing in low-poverty neighborhoods that 
offer the best schools, employment opportunities and range of services. The inclusion of market-rate 
units can provide assurance that both the design and the management will be of high quality.  
 
c. Build a Political Constituency for Affordable Housing  
Given the general reluctance of government to provide adequate resources for antipoverty programs, 
and the common perception that past resources for housing were spent on ill-conceived developments 
that often made neighborhoods worse, attaining public support for affordable housing is an uphill 
battle, particularly at the federal level. By assisting low- and moderate-income families, who are more 
likely to vote than extremely low-income families, a broader political constituency can be built in 
support of affordable housing. Legislators are also more likely to support housing that aids the 
“deserving poor” of working families rather than an additional subsidy to families who are reliant 
upon public assistance and may not be working steadily. To the degree that families living in market-
rate units benefit from good housing at competitive rents, another potential constituency can be built 
around them. Developers should also be willing to support additional funding, as they will benefit 
from increased housing starts. Finally, if mixed-income housing is successful in developing units that 
are of high quality, the public may be more willing to support initiatives that do not repeat mistakes of 
the past and offer a clear social benefit. If the properties developed today are still successful 15 years 
from now, affordable-housing advocates will have a stronger case for more public funding.  
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III. MIXES, MARKETS AND MOTIVATIONS  
Mixed-income housing is a broad term that carries different meaning for different audiences. The 
Millennial Housing Commission, academic authors, and the wide range of practitioners each define 
mixed-income housing differently.49 To some, a truly mixed-income development must include 
market-rate, or close to market-rate, units. For others, mixed-income developments are exactly what 
the name implies, a mix of incomes without strict definitions on how high or low the incomes of the 
residents are. Other authors have also categorized different properties by the nature of the funding 
that was used to produce the units.50 The tenure type of the development (home-ownership, rental or 
cooperative) may be another way to classify developments. And finally, some classifications 
emphasize different characteristics of the tenants, such as employment status or families with 
children, rather than simply the mix of incomes.51 Regardless of the definition, mixed-income 
developments vary greatly depending upon the same factors as any other housing development: 
population served, location, tenure type, management and scale.  
 
The previous section discussed the underlying motivation for a mixed-income approach and the goals 
such developments aim to accomplish. However, like any other real estate development, the market 
determines to a great extent what mix of incomes is possible. A mixed-income development located 
in a very soft market will have a difficult time renting market units to high-income households. 
Furthermore, not every mixed-income development or funding program places the same priority on 
the various goals. Some may place top priority on building units with a low amount of subsidy, while 
others are most concerned with providing greater life chances for their low-income residents. The 
priority given to different goals also helps to shape the mix of incomes in the development. Thus, a 
combination of the market and the priority given to the goals results in the mix of incomes served.  
 
While there is clearly a wide range of mixed-income developments, it may be helpful to think of them 
as falling on a scale where properties take on an identity that is closer or further away from being a 
true market-rate property. Within that scale, there are at least five different categories of mixed-
income properties. It should be noted that some of the properties serve very few, or no, families with 
incomes below 30 percent of AMI. This income level is generally associated with the federal poverty 
level and is the income group with the greatest housing needs (see Table 1).52 While there are always 
exceptions, properties that fit within these categories of income mixes generally share similar motiva-
tions and markets. Table 2 describes five categories of mixes and an example of the range of incomes 
that might be served in such a development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Brophy, 1997; Khadduri, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1998; and Wilkins, 2001. 
50 Schwartz, 1997. 
51 Khadurri and Martin (1997) offer culture-of-work properties as one category of mixed-income properties. 
Such properties are defined as developments in which fewer than 20 percent of the tenants have incomes above 
$20,000, and more than 70 percent have wages as their primary source of income. The authors also exclude 
developments in which fewer than 20 percent of the units are occupied by families with incomes below $10,000 
per year. They do not consider these to be mixed-income housing as they serve too few poor households. 
52 The federal poverty level in 2001 for a household of three persons was $14,269, compared to the income level 
of $16,344 equal to 30 percent of national median income for a family of three. 
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Table 2. Categories of Mixed-income Developments and Incomes Served 
Illustrative Mix of Incomes 
Category Description 
% of Units % of AMI 
Moderate-Income 
Inclusion 
 
Predominately market-rate developments 
that include units for moderate-income 
households. 
80% 
20 
Market 
 80% 
Low-Income 
Inclusion 
Predominately market-rate developments 
that include units for low-income 
households. 
80 
20 
Market 
50 
Broad Range of 
Incomes 
Serves market-rate, moderate income or 
low-income households, and extremely 
low-income households. 
33 
33 
33 
Market 
60 
30 
Market-Rate 
Inclusion 
Predominately low income developments 
that include market-rate units. 
20 
80 
Market 
50/60 
Affordable Mix Serves moderate or low-income and 
extremely low-income households. 
50 
50 
60 
30 
100% 
Market-Rate 
100% 
Low-Income 
 
While Table 2 illustrates the mix of incomes that may be served in different types of developments, 
the mix of incomes within the same type of development will vary greatly by market and geographic 
area. Table 3 illustrates the different income levels of households at different percentages of the AMI 
in high-, median- and lower-income areas. It also shows the median rent in these different markets 
and the percentage of AMI at which the rent would be affordable.53 As this table demonstrates, in 
tight markets such as Boston, the market-rate rents may be close to or above the AMI, while in others 
such as Houston, market-rate rents may be at levels of AMI considered to be low- or moderate-
income households. The income of a three-person household is used as a basis for comparison as this 
is close to the average household size of families in subsidized housing.54 
 
Table 3. Income Ranges and Rents in Different Markets55 
Income Limit for a 3-Person Household, FY 2002 Income Group 
(% of AMI) Boston, MA Houston, TX Mobile, AL 
100 $66,833  $53,667* $40,667 
80 53,586 42,934 32,534 
60 40,190 32,200 24,400 
50 33,492 26,834 20,333 
30 20,095 16,100 12,200 
Median Rent 2 Bedroom Apt. $1,338 $709 $534 
Income Needed to Afford Rent (% of AMI) $53,520 
(80%) 
$28,360 
(53%) 
$21,360 
(53%) 
*The median income for Houston is close to the national median income of $54,481 (2001). 
                                                          
53 Rents are generally considered affordable if they make up 30 percent of a household’s income or less.  
54 The average household size in public housing is 2.4, and 2.8 in Section 8–assisted households. 
55 Data is from HUD, FY 2002 Income Limits, and 50th Percentile Rent Estimates. See www.huduser.org. 
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In order to assess whether mixed-income developments are accomplishing their goals, it is important 
to note how the primary motivation for mixing incomes differs for various types of developments. If 
achieving a cross subsidy from the market units to the low-income units was never a realistic goal for 
a development in a low-income neighborhood, it should hardly be considered a failure when that goal 
is not met. Table 4 shows the primary motivations and the types of markets most commonly 
associated with each category of mix. This table is meant to be illustrative of the different markets 
and motivations associated with different mixes, rather than a scientific model. The motivations are 
based on interviews with developers and descriptions of various developments. The “Likely Market” 
column suggests the types of markets in which developments with a certain mix of incomes are most 
commonly located. A distinction is made between high-cost markets and tight markets. Some markets 
have low vacancy rates and are tight, but their rents are still relatively low compared to high-cost 
markets such as Boston, San Francisco or New York, where the median rent or home price is high 
compared to the median income. 
 
Table 4. Income Mixes, Motivations, and Markets 
High-Priority Motivation 
Category Likely 
Market Avoid Negative 
Behavior 
Improve 
Life 
Chances 
Rebuild 
Healthy 
Com- 
munity 
High-
Quality 
Units 
High-
Quality 
Mainte-
nance 
Less 
Subsidy 
Assuage 
Com- 
munity 
Concerns
Build 
Political 
Consti- 
tuency 
Moderate-
Income 
Inclusion  
High-cost    X X X X  
Low-Income 
Inclusion 
High-cost 
or Tight X X  X X X X  
Broad Range 
of Incomes 
Tight or 
Transi-
tional 
X X X X X  X  
Market 
Inclusion 
Transi-
tional X X X X X  X  
Affordable 
Mix Soft X X X X X    
 
The following are examples of projects for each of the five general income categories. The funding 
sources and locations are representative of many, but not all, developments that fit within a category.  
 
Moderate-Income Inclusion 
Mix: These are developments in which a small minority, perhaps 10 to 20 percent, of the units are set 
at below-market-rate prices. The prices are also set to be affordable to households at the higher end of 
the affordable-housing spectrum, such as 80 percent of AMI. Because the affordable units are set at a 
relatively high threshold, many of the developments offer units for home ownership. 
Market: These markets are typically in high-cost housing markets. 
Primary Motivations: Because such developments serve a higher-income and stable population 
among needy families, these families would seem to have more housing options and be less likely to 
live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty. The primary motivation for facilitating an 
“upper-income-mix” development thus appears to be the ability to use less subsidy in constructing the 
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units. In addition, such a mix may be very effective in overcoming community objections to afford-
able housing. Also, such developments may provide work-force housing in high-cost areas, offering 
affordable housing for teachers, police officers or other needed workers.  
Funding: While zoning laws often facilitate these types of developments, they are usually privately 
financed. Incentives such as density bonuses or the easing of other zoning restrictions may be offered 
to encourage developers or to offset potential losses from the affordable units. 
The Local Initiative Program (40B) program in Massachusetts allows developers to obtain 
“comprehensive zoning” approval, avoiding lengthy zoning appeals and hearings, if 25 percent of 
the units are affordable to households under 80 percent of AMI and are relatively indistinguishable 
and interspersed with the market-rate units.  
Low-Income Inclusion 
Mix: The vast majority of the units in these developments are market rate, but the affordable units 
that are included reach down to a lower-income population, such as 50 percent of AMI. Including 
home-ownership units is less common, particularly for the affordable units, since they serve a low-
income population.  
Market: Such developments are typically in high-cost or relatively tight housing markets. 
Primary Motivation: A primary motivation for such developments is the potential to build low-
income units with less subsidy. Other strong motivations are that the units are likely to be of high 
quality since they must be of same quality as the market-rate units, and they are likely to be located in 
low-poverty neighborhoods, where higher-income families will be attracted. Including affordable 
units as a minimal part of a higher-income development may also be a more amenable way for a 
community to accept the presence of affordable housing.  
Funding: New York City and Massachusetts have created 80/20 programs that offer tax-exempt or 
taxable financing for projects in which 20 percent of the units are reserved for households with 
incomes of less than 50 percent of AMI. New York City also allows 25 percent of the units to be 
reserved for households at 60 percent AMI. Developments in which 20 percent of the units are 
reserved for households under 50 percent AMI may also use LIHTC funding, although it is unclear 
how often this option is used when the rest of the units are market rate.  
Chelsea Centro: A project financed by the New York City Housing Development Corporation is 
currently in construction on West 26th Street and Seventh Avenue in the Chelsea neighborhood of 
Manhattan. It consists of two newly constructed buildings containing 356 residential units, of 
which 71 will be reserved for tenants with incomes less than 50 percent of AMI. The project was 
financed with a taxable bond and a low-interest second mortgage of $20,000 per low-income unit.56 
                                                          
56 New York City Housing Development Corporation, 2002; www.nychdc.org. 
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Broad Range of Incomes 
Mix: These developments have a strong balance between market-rate units and affordable units. 
However, the affordable units are targeted to families with 50 to 60 percent of AMI, or within range 
of the LIHTC subsidy. Home-ownership units may be part of the mix to attract higher-income 
families. 
Market: Due to the large number of market units, the development generally needs to be in either a 
strong housing market or in a transitional neighborhood with characteristics that give it potential to 
attract higher-income households. However, additional subsidy may be needed to attract higher-
income tenants to the market-rate units. 
Primary Motivation: The strongest motivation in some of these developments may be to revitalize a 
transitional area by attracting higher-income families. Also, because tenants can move from a low-
income unit into a higher-income unit as their incomes increase, or vice versa if their incomes 
decrease, the stability of the neighborhood may be enhanced. Another primary motivation is to meet 
the housing needs of families with a broad range of incomes. By serving a broader market, it may be 
easier to rent all of the units.  
Funding: The funding for these developments may include LIHTC, HOME and/or HOPE VI. 
Crawford Square Development: Located in the blighted Hill District neighborhood of Pittsburgh, 
the Crawford Square development is aiming to create a viable, mixed-income community of 550 
units. The first two phases totaled 331 units, with about half market-rate and half subsidized. Of 
these units, 57 were for sale. Rents in the rental units range from about $300 to $800. While the 
neighborhood was a difficult market in which to attract higher-income residents, the development 
benefited from close proximity to downtown, as well as a scale large enough to have a significant 
positive impact on the neighborhood. The project was funded through a combination of loans and 
grants from the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, HOME loans, foundation grants 
and LIHTC equity.57 
Market Inclusion 
Mix: These are developments that predominantly serve low-income residents, with a minority of the 
units serving market-rate units. Home ownership may be included. 
Market: These developments are generally in a transitional neighborhood. 
Primary Motivation: A strong motivation for such developments is the possibility of positive 
interaction between the lower-income and higher-income tenants. While the number of market-rate 
units is limited, their inclusion may be seen as an important step in attracting higher-income families 
into a distressed neighborhood. The presence of higher-income families may also be a key factor for 
such a development in developing and maintaining the housing at a high standard. Because extra 
amenities may be needed to attract higher-income families, using less subsidy is not a primary 
motivation.  
Funding: The funding for these developments may include HOPE VI, LIHTC, Section 8 and/or 
HOME. 
                                                          
57 Jones, 1995. 
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Spring View Housing Project: The San Antonio Housing Authority was awarded a $48.8 million 
HOPE VI grant in 1994 to redevelop its troubled Spring View housing project, located in a high-
crime and high-poverty neighborhood. SAHA demolished 421 units and replaced them with 208 
public-housing units limited to households with incomes below 30 percent AMI and 105 units for 
market-rate home ownership. Due the soft real estate market for the neighborhood, incentives such 
as down-payment assistance and a zero-interest second mortgage were offered to homebuyers of 
market-rate units. Sale prices ranged from $52,672 to $65,957, and the income of the homebuyers 
ranged from 83 percent to 96 percent of AMI.58 
Affordable Mix 
Mix: These developments do not include market-rate units, but have a strong mix of tenants with 
extremely low incomes (below 30 percent of AMI) and those with incomes between 30 to 80 percent 
of AMI. A significant difference in the characteristics of the tenants may be that those in the higher-
income group have steady employment and are not reliant upon public assistance.  
Market: These are generally located in communities in which the market is not strong enough to 
attract tenants with incomes that approach the AMI. 
Primary Motivation: The strongest motivation appears to be the potential for positive social inter-
action between the higher- and lower-income tenants. While all the tenants may be classified as low- 
or moderate-income, the higher-income tenants are more likely to have steady employment, which 
may help to create a culture of work at the development as well as reduce negative behavior. The 
housing quality and maintenance are also clearly key elements of any development, but because the 
incomes of all tenants are limited, the importance of market pressures in setting a high standard of 
quality is also limited. Also, since all units in such a development receive some form of subsidy, 
cross-subsidization is not an issue.  
Funding: The funding for these developments may include LIHTC, Section 8, HOME, HOPE VI 
and/or tax-exempt 501(c)3 bonds. 
Lake Parc Place: In an attempt to reduce the concentration of extremely low-income families, a 
deteriorating public-housing project in Chicago was redeveloped into Lake Parc Place. Initially, 
half of the tenants are public-housing tenants and half are households with incomes between 50 and 
80 of AMI. The average income of public-housing tenants is $4,930, compared to $21,789 for the 
higher-income tenants. Although both groups are living in subsidized housing, the relative dif-
ference in incomes is as large if not larger than the difference in the other types of mixed-income 
developments. Given Lake Parc Place’s location in a neighborhood with a 72-percent poverty rate, 
rents were capped at $371 for five years in order to attract the higher-income tenants. The project 
was funded in large part through the MINCS program, the precursor to HOPE VI.59 
 
 
                                                          
58 Salama, 1999. 
59 Rosenbaum, 1998. 
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IV. IS MIXED-INCOME HOUSING ACCOMPLISHING ITS GOALS? 
If mixed-income housing is to continue to gain acceptance as a preferred approach to developing 
affordable housing, some evidence of its effectiveness is necessary. An evaluation of mixed-income 
housing must then answer two questions: 
 
 
 
                                                          
Is a mixed-income approach to affordable housing accomplishing its fundamental goals? 
To the extent that a mixed-income approach is successful, is it due to the mix of incomes or to 
other unrelated factors? Put differently, is a mixed-income approach necessary to accomplish the 
same goals? 
 
The research that has been conducted on the effectiveness of a mixed-income approach is limited and 
has focused primarily upon case studies of individual developments. Some researchers have seized 
upon the potential benefits of mixed-income housing and offered assessments, such as that of Diane 
Suchman: “Living in a mixed-income environment, lower-income families enjoy a better, more 
secure physical environment and a more beneficial social milieu that includes positive, economically 
independent role models.”60 Based on such positive assessments, the case studies have been used to 
draw conclusions about the conditions and practices that lead to successful mixed-income 
developments.61  
 
Relatively few researchers have undertaken a more systematic evaluation of mixed-income develop-
ments to determine their effectiveness in meeting specific goals, rather than taking a broad overview 
of a development.62 Furthermore, very little attention has been paid to the question of whether a 
mixed-income approach is necessary. Can other strategies achieve the same goals with an all-low-
income population? As Rachel Bratt notes, “What comes with mixed income is a bundle of housing 
attributes that allows policymakers to say how well it works. If you provide very-low-income people 
with good management, a good living environment, good maintenance, and housing that blends in, 
mixed income may not be necessary.”63  
 
Because the research is limited, much is still unknown about mixed-income housing and cannot be 
conclusively addressed in this paper. The goal of this section is to use the prior research and inter-
views conducted with developers and financiers of mixed-income housing to offer some insight into 
the both the effectiveness and necessity of a mixed-income approach, as these questions are often 
glossed over in policy discussions. Each of the goals articulated as a response to the drivers of policy 
discussed in Section II will be individually assessed. 
 
1. Driver of Policy: Adverse Effects of Concentrations of Poverty 
Is a mixed-income approach effective in alleviating the adverse effects of high concentrations of 
poverty? 
 
a. Goal: Avoid Negative Behavior 
Perhaps most disturbing to the general public about high-poverty neighborhoods or housing develop-
ments is the incidence of negative social behavior, such as violent crime or drug use. Prior to its 
60 Diane Suchman, 1995, p. 1. 
61 Shubert and Thresher, Three Case Studies of Mixed-Income Housing Development, 1996; Khadduri and 
Martin, 1997. 
62 Brophy, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1995; Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 2001. 
63 Interview with Rachel Bratt, Tufts University, August 7, 2002. 
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redevelopment into a mixed-income community, the Columbia Point public-housing development in 
Boston was perceived to be so dangerous that fire trucks and ambulances would not enter without a 
police escort.64 For low-income Americans, overcoming the barriers of a limited education, low-
performing local schools for one’s children, a lack of employment opportunities and racism present a 
significant challenge by any standard. Trying to meet this challenge in an environment where drugs, 
violent crime and gang activity are constant threats can be nearly impossible. Thus, eliminating these 
threats and behavior in one’s housing is a key starting point to breaking the cycle of poverty. Allan 
Mendelowitz of the Federal Housing Finance Board notes, “Housing cannot be expected to solve 
every problem, but it should not exacerbate existing problems.”65 
 
Mixed-income housing is offered as a solution to reducing these negative behaviors because the 
higher-income households will not tolerate crime or drug trafficking in their housing development. 
The theory is that higher-income households will either place more pressure on management or police 
to address the problems, will refuse to live in the development (thereby imposing de facto pressure on 
management), or will confront tenants engaged in negative behavior. Some evidence seems to 
confirm this theory. Rosenbaum’s study of Lake Parc Place in Chicago reported that the higher-
income tenants were more likely than the public-housing tenants to support all of management’s 
rules. Lake Parc Place also experienced significant reductions in crime that could not be achieved at 
other public-housing projects in Chicago, even with extensive efforts.66 Marcos Andrade, 
management assistant of the HOPE VI redevelopment of the Mathew Henson homes in Phoenix, 
points out that his intervention was necessary in requesting that a prostitute openly soliciting 
customers on the premises leave. What was disturbing to him was that no tenants stepped forward to 
complain. In seeking to include a mixed-income component to the redevelopment, he commented that 
“Perceptions and standards of what is allowable need to change.”67  
 
A problem with this theory, however, is that it presumes negative behavior on the part of low-income 
tenants. Interviews with property managers revealed few problems with their low-income tenants, 
even those with Section 8 vouchers — who tended to have the lowest incomes. Particularly for house-
holds earning upwards of 50 to 60 percent of AMI, or between $30,000 and $40,000 in some areas, 
concerns about bad behavior seem misplaced. One set of managers of mixed-income developments in 
New York City interviewed found, “no relationship at all between household income and the need for 
maintenance and repairs.” 68 Also, the negative behaviors that arise may be isolated to a few 
individuals who may or may not be tenants. The Orchard Park public-housing development in Boston 
was one of the largest concentrations of crime in the city. After the demolition and redevelopment of 
the development and introduction of higher-income tenants, crime on the property was greatly 
reduced. This represents a major success in the redevelopment of the housing project and of the 
community. However, as one police officer observed, the drug dealers had not been converted into 
good citizens, but had moved onto a different part of the neighborhood.69  
 
The ability to manage negative social behaviors appears to have far more to do with the practices of 
the management than the income mix of the tenants. As noted in the case of Marcos Andrade of the 
Mathew Henson homes in Phoenix, while standards of the tenants are important, an active manage-
ment office committed to a high-quality living environment can achieve many of the same goals. 
Other property managers confirm the importance of strong management in avoiding problems. 
                                                          
64 Schubert and Thresher, 1996. 
65 Comment in discussion group, August 15, 2002. 
66 Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn, 1998.  
67 Interview with Marcos Andrade, August 2, 2002. 
68 Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 2001, p. 16.  
69 Comments of the police officer during a site visit to the redeveloped Orchard Gardens, March 2002.  
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Patricia Garrett of the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Housing Partnership reports, “We manage them like 
crazy and are right on top of any violations.”70 
Furthermore, many property managers of affordable-housing developments impose both strict 
screening and behavior standards. To live in many affordable-housing developments, tenants must 
pass a credit check, have a clean criminal record, have a good history with past landlords, and have a 
meeting with the manager, prior to residency. Evelyn Friedman of Nuestra Comunidad Development 
Corporation in Boston added that, “If possible, we also check the conditions of the current residence 
of potential tenants.”71 Screening standards at redeveloped HOPE VI properties are also stronger, if 
somewhat inconsistent. Residents must be in “good standing” and pass a credit check.72 In addition, 
residents at HOPE VI properties must also sign a new lease that has stricter provisions. In Phoenix, 
residents who move back will have to sign an agreement to work with family social services.73 
Management standards are equally strict. Nuestra and other property managers are clear that an 
incidence of drugs or violence is grounds for eviction. Thus, any tenants who are likely to cause 
problems are not admitted, and those who do cause problems are evicted immediately.  
 
While the practice of strict screening and management appears to be effective in reducing negative 
behaviors in a property, it is also likely to serve those who would have the best chance of attaining 
housing, albeit at higher prices. Universally applying very strict screening risks leaving out a 
population of low-income households that can no longer be served in “mainstream” affordable 
housing. For example, if a criminal record is a hurdle to renting an apartment, one in five black men 
is excluded from affordable properties. Managers point out that since there is such a need for housing, 
priority should be given to those who will be respectful tenants. Also, because many affordable 
developments have such low revenues, management cannot admit tenants who, due to their credit or 
rental history, appear to be at risk of not paying their rents.  
 
Conclusion: Affordable-housing developers and property managers commonly apply very strict 
tenant screening and management measures. With strict screening and property management, the 
role of a mixed-income approach in reducing negative behavior appears to be limited. A note of 
concern is that low-income households that may have the greatest difficulty finding housing in the 
market will not be served by affordable developments, particularly mixed-income developments.  
 
b. Goal: Offer More Life Chances 
In addition to reducing negative behavior, mixed-income housing is intended to encourage positive, 
upwardly mobile behaviors. This positive behavior, as well as new life chances, is thought to occur 
for low-income families through both observation of, and interaction with, higher-income families. 
While the negative effects and limited opportunities that accompany large concentrations of poverty 
are clear, the method of transferring positive influence, as well as the type of influence, from higher-
income to lower-income families within housing developments is often unclear. Many proponents 
offer rationales that include the possibility of role-modeling, creating job networks and social capital, 
all with the hope that “higher-income households within the residential environment will influence 
the goals, perceptions and opportunities of [low-income households] toward greater labor market 
participation and ‘mainstream’ behavior.”74  
 
                                                          
70 Interview with Patricia Garrett, July 15, 2002. 
71 Interview with Evelyn Friedman, July 15, 2002. 
72 False HOPE, 2002. 
73 Interview with Marcos Andrade, August 2, 2002. 
74 Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 2001, p. 28. 
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Working, and the transfer of a work ethic, is at the core of the rationale for mixed-income housing. 
David Connelly, president of Housing Opportunities Unlimited, comments, “One of the really great 
strengths of mixed-income communities is that young people see others going to work, and it enlarges 
what they feel they can accomplish.”75 Mossik Hacobian, a nonprofit developer of mixed-income 
housing, offers a different view of his tenants: “They go to work because they have to, not because 
they see someone going to work.”76 These different perceptions may speak to the different mix of 
low-income tenants within a development. For families at 50 to 60 percent of AMI, where at least one 
member of the family is working steadily, the transfer of mainstream values may not be a relevant 
goal. For extremely low-income tenants who have a limited work history, the importance of positive 
influence would seem to be greater. There may even be negative values to be transferred from higher- 
to lower-income tenants. Michael Pyatok, a designer and developer of affordable housing, notes from 
personal experience that the values he encountered when attending a private school in an adjacent, 
higher-income neighborhood were “arrogance, disrespect for authority, [and] spoiled and self-
centered attitudes.” 
 
He asserts that the value of work was easier to find in his own working-class neighborhood rather 
than in associating with high-income families.77 Pyatok also suggests that developments that include 
very-high-income families with families struggling to find work can create a “cruel juxtaposition.”  
 
These statements underscore the disagreement over the need for certain influences from higher-
income populations. How such influence is actually exerted, or even if it is exerted, is also very 
poorly understood. Opinion is even divided over whether interaction is actually needed.78 Few studies 
have been conducted documenting either the degree of interaction between tenants in mixed-income 
developments, particularly between income groups, or any positive results that occur for tenants in 
such developments. The primary findings of these studies are listed below: 
 
 
 
                                                          
Lake Parc Place, Chicago: A deteriorating public-housing project in Chicago was redeveloped 
into Lake Parc Place (described in more detail on page 20). Initially, half of the tenants were 
public-housing tenants and half were households with incomes between 50 and 80 of AMI. This 
study found moderate levels of interaction among tenants. Almost all tenants greet a neighbor 
often, many talk to neighbors for more than 10 minutes at least once a month, and about half of 
both income groups volunteer on the grounds. More complex interactions, such as having a meal 
with a neighbor, are rarer and only occur about once a year, but about half of the tenants of each 
group have at least one friend in the development. Some employment opportunities were also 
created for other tenants as babysitters or beauticians. Two factors that the authors suggest may 
have contributed to the interaction among tenants is that all were of the same race (African-
American), and that many of the higher-income tenants had lived previously in public housing. 
Increases in employment were not observed for residents living in this development.79  
 
Various developments, New York City, Boston, Chicago, Bay Area of California: The authors 
conducted interviews with residents, property managers, service providers and project sponsors at 
several different developments. Developments in Chicago and New York found a high degree of 
interaction among tenants, although the degree of interaction between income groups is unclear. 
While residents offered each other advice and tips, “the overwhelming consensus was that many 
more residents owed their jobs to the developments’ social service staff than to their neighbors.” 
75 Suchman, 1995, p. 11. 
76 Interview with Mossik Hacobian, August 1, 2002. 
77 Pyatok, 2000, p. 2. 
78 Wilkins, 2001. 
79 Rosenbaum, Flynn and Stroh, 1998.  
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Information on interaction was difficult for the authors to gain for developments in Massachusetts 
and California, but managers reported that it seemed to be minimal. Based on their observations 
of differences in interaction, they conclude that, “It appears that the relative cultural homogeneity 
of residents, in addition to the availability of opportunities to interact usually organized by 
management, seemed to increase the propensity to interact.”80 
 
 
 
                                                          
Various developments, Boston; New Haven; San Francisco; Oakland; Montgomery County, 
Maryland; Kansas City: The authors studied seven different mixed-income developments, each 
with a different mix of incomes. Residents interviewed at these developments generally described 
“Low or very low levels of neighboring, even lacking the ability to name their immediate neigh-
bors.” In the Harbor Point development in Boston, tension was found to exist between the low-
income and higher-income tenants, and vandalism to vehicles was common. Across the develop-
ments studied, few market-rate tenants attended building activities. The propensity for interacting 
in some of the developments may have been limited by the difference in household composition. 
Upper-income tenants tended to be white and childless, while the lower-income families were 
predominantly African-American or Latino families with children.81 
 
Ellen Wilson Dwellings, Washington, D.C.: A vacant public-housing development in Capitol Hill 
was demolished and rebuilt with 134 units of mixed-income housing under the HOPE VI 
program. Twenty-five percent of the units are reserved for households under 25 percent of AMI, 
25 percent of the units are for households with incomes between 25 to 50 percent of AMI, and 50 
percent of the units are for households with incomes between 50 to 110 percent of AMI. While 
63 percent of tenants reported that they socialize with other neighborhood residents, only 19 
percent said that they socialize with other residents within the development. However, sixty-six 
percent reported that neighbors were willing to help each other, and 71 percent of residents 
report that they always or sometimes attend resident meetings. Because a majority of the tenants 
had lived there less than one year, interaction levels might be expected to increase in the future.82 
 
These findings show inconsistent patterns of interaction between tenants, and very few positive 
employment opportunities that can be attributed to interaction between a low- and high-income 
resident. As Schwartz and Tajbakhsh note, to the degree that there is interaction, it seems to due to a 
strong effort by the property management. In the case of the Ellen Wilson Dwellings, a cooperative 
financial arrangement was established to encourage residents’ participation in the affairs of the 
development. Schwartz and Tajbakhsh’s other finding that cultural homogeneity increases interaction 
raises a note of caution. If mixed-income housing is intended to provide a means of encouraging 
interaction between residents with different values and experiences, homogeneity as precondition for 
interaction offers an almost self-defeating proposition. The properties that seem to promote the most 
interaction are those, such as Lake Parc Place, that include tenants within a modest range of incomes. 
In properties where the differences in income and lifestyles is significant, such as an “Affordable 
Inclusion” development, the probability of interaction may be quite remote.  
 
It should also be noted that the ability of developments to offer services to promote life chances may 
even be constrained by a mix of incomes. It can be more cost-effective to offer supportive services to 
a large concentration of clients with similar needs rather than serving clients over a larger area. 
Developers and property managers may also be reluctant to offer some needed services on-site for 
fear of advertising the low incomes of many tenants and alienating the higher-income tenants.  
 
80 Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 2001. 
81 Brophy and Smith, 1997. 
82 Holin and Amendolia, 2001. 
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As referenced in Section II, the prospect for positive outcomes appears to be stronger when the influ-
ence of higher-income households is considered at the neighborhood level. Studies of the Moving to 
Opportunity and Gautreaux programs found many positive, though inconsistent, effects of moving 
families from public housing in high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty neighborhoods. Many 
participants in the Moving to Opportunity study reported that their new neighborhoods were safe, 
their new neighbors exhibited positive behavior, the quality of the schools was improved when a 
move to a suburban school district was involved, and that their neighbors and new location were 
helpful in opening economic opportunities. However, other participants had few connections with 
their new neighbors, saw little or no improvement in the local schools, and were restricted from 
employment by multiple skill and health barriers.83 These results highlight the broad range of chal-
lenges faced by families in overcoming poverty. They also point to the importance of other factors, 
such as schools and economic opportunities, that function at a community level and cannot be 
affected significantly within a single housing development. 
 
Conclusion: The limited evidence available suggests that meaningful interaction and transfer of 
positive influences among tenants in mixed-income developments is rather limited. Strong efforts on 
the part of property managers is likely needed to facilitate such interaction. The evidence, while still 
limited, suggests that healthy neighborhoods can have positive effects for low-income families. 
 
c. Goal: Rebuild Healthy Communities 
Following from the preceding discussion, if healthy communities are most important, are mixed-
income properties successful in helping to achieve this goal? Because evaluations have not been 
conducted to determine the role of mixed-income developments in neighborhood revitalization, this 
question is difficult to answer. As discussed in Section II, if mixed-income properties can help rebuild 
neighborhoods, they can likely do so in two ways: by having a visible effect upon the physical 
environment, and by attracting households with a broad range of incomes to a distressed area. The 
visible effect of attractive new housing and its ability to attract further investment would seem 
achievable regardless of the mix of incomes within the development. A more pressing question is 
whether an all-low-income development can be built and maintained to a standard high enough to 
achieve the same effect. This question will be explored in the next section.  
 
Much research has shown that attracting non-poor households to a community is critically important 
to creating a market for services, building a healthier social environment, and exerting political power 
to improve municipal services. In that mixed-income developments have attracted higher-income 
families to distressed neighborhoods, they have been successful in achieving this first step to rebuild-
ing a healthy community. Of course, the range of incomes that can be attracted into a development is 
critically dependent upon the strength of the housing market. In the example of Lake Parc Place, 
attracting households with incomes above 80 percent of AMI may have been nearly impossible. 
Market-rate units are a core component of plans for the redevelopment of the Mathew Henson homes 
in Phoenix. However, this neighborhood and the large number of neighboring vacant lots combine to 
present a soft rental housing market, which is a serious challenge to attracting higher-income families.  
 
The larger question is whether these developments have had broader impact within a neighborhood. 
Anecdotally, mixed-income developments, particularly those on a larger scale such as HOPE VI 
developments, appear to be having a positive effect in this regard. Two-thirds of residents report that 
the neighborhood housing the Ellen Wilson Dwellings has become safer since their redevelopment. 
New investment is taking place in the area next to the Cabrini-Green redevelopment in Chicago. 
Home prices in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston near the Orchard Park redevelopment have 
                                                          
83 Popkin, Harris and Cuningham, 2002. 
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soared by 290 percent since 1996.84 In the case of HOPE VI developments, many of the initial 
positive effects are presumably from the demolition of a troubled housing development that was a 
center of crime and drug activity, the addition of attractive new homes, and tighter screening of 
tenants. The role of the new mix of incomes may be important, but it may also be overshadowed by 
these other factors.  
 
What makes mixed-income developments attractive from the standpoint of neighborhood develop-
ment is that they can serve both needy residents and build a base of higher-income households as 
well. For example, the Orchard Park housing development reserves 85 percent of the units for a range 
of low-income families and 15 percent for market-rate units. While the focus of this development is 
clearly on serving needy families, a significant number of units are also used to attract higher-income 
households. Some developments, perhaps serving over 1,000 residents, are large enough that they 
represent a small community in themselves. Building a healthy, mixed-income community may be 
achieved within the development.  
 
However, trying to serve these twin goals in one development does not always fit the overall needs of 
a neighborhood. Gregg Warren comments on the low-income communities he serves in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, “Distressed neighborhoods already have plenty of low-cost rental units. What they 
need is home-ownership opportunities.”85 By focusing on home ownership in distressed communities, 
the range of incomes that can be served by such developments is generally limited to a higher-income 
population. The need for a mixed-income strategy can vary even within a neighborhood. Mossik 
Hacobian described how one area of a neighborhood in Boston contained several blocks of public and 
low-income housing. Thus, Urban Edge included a market-rate component in a development in the 
area. Several blocks away, the housing is predominantly market rate. In this location, the decision was 
made to focus on developing affordable housing. By keeping an eye on the overall mix of an area, 
Urban Edge could help to ensure that social services for that area would not be overwhelmed.86 Felix 
Torres of Manchester Neighborhood Housing Services offers, “It is important to have a mix of 
properties for different incomes around the neighborhood, but not very important to have a mix of 
incomes within the property itself.”87  
 
Including a mix of incomes can also limit other community-development strategies tied to a develop-
ment. In a town in western Washington state, a group of Southeast Asian immigrants organized to 
have an affordable-housing development built. They also wanted a development that reflected their 
cultural tradition, both in the architecture and uses allowed in the property. Toward this end, the 
development has a 6,000-square-foot vegetable garden and porches for hanging clothes to dry. The 
Hismen Hin-nu Terrace development in Oakland, targeted to families with incomes of 50 to 60 
percent of AMI, seeks to celebrate the cultural diversity of the neighborhood. Murals, frieze panels, 
decorative tiles and steel entry gates in the form of a burst of sunshine depict the multi-ethnic mix of 
African-, Latino-, and Native-American tenants.88 Including higher-income tenants does not preclude 
the addition of unique cultural elements. However, developments that emphasize attracting high-
income tenants are more likely to favor amenities and a traditional design over celebrating the cultural 
tradition of a community. Preserving and building upon a cultural asset can be a key strategy in 
building a healthy community, but may not be compatible with every mix of incomes.  
 
                                                          
84 Dimitracopoulos and Pollner, 2002. 
85 Interview with Gregg Warren, July 11, 2002. 
86 Interview with Mossik Hacobian, August 1, 2002. 
87 Interview with Felix Torres, July 10, 2002. 
88 Jones, Pettus and Pyatok, 1995, p. 100. 
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Conclusion: Mixed-income developments, particularly large-scale HOPE VI redevelopments, have 
demonstrated effectiveness in revitalizing distressed neighborhoods. However, a mixed-income 
approach is only one strategy, and often not the most feasible strategy, to rebuild neighborhoods and 
meet the housing needs of a low-income population.  
 
2. Driver of Policy: Poor Quality of Subsidized Low-Income Housing 
Is mixed-income housing more effective in producing high-quality, affordable housing? 
 
a. Goal: Develop High-Quality Housing 
The poor quality and stigma of many subsidized low-income housing developments, particularly 
inner-city public-housing developments, has led many to condemn an all-low-income approach to 
affordable housing. As noted in Section II, while most of the nation’s subsidized housing stock is of 
good quality, too much of it can still be identified as “low-income housing.” Thus, the implicit 
benchmark for affordable-housing design is that it goes unnoticed and blends in with other middle-
class housing. While there are no comprehensive surveys of the mixed-income housing stock, nearly 
all of the mixed-income properties that have been documented appear to meet this benchmark and be 
of good quality. 
 
However, many all-low-income developments now also meet a high standard. Painfully aware that 
the image of troubled public-housing projects is linked to low-income housing, many affordable-
housing developers and designers have focused on building their housing to a very high standard. 
Architect Michael Pyatok notes, “Good design can alleviate any stigma associated with low-income 
housing.” The market pressure from serving a higher-income population is offered as a key feature of 
mixed-income approach in building affordable units to a high standard. However, developers of 
affordable housing often note that the pressure from the community in which they build is as strong if 
not stronger. Both high- and low-income communities, wary of approving any type of new develop-
ment, are particularly reluctant to approve housing serving a low-income population. Concerned 
about social problems and poor quality accompanying low-income housing, developers are forced to 
design developments that meet a high standard and will not have a negative visual effect upon a 
neighborhood. While community pressure most clearly applies to neighborhood-based housing 
developers who must build in one area repeatedly, it can also apply to for-profit developers who may 
only build one development in a community. 
 
What mixed-income developments may bring that all-low-income developments do not is extra 
amenities. Developers report that in order to attract market-rate rents in mixed-income developments, 
amenities such as pools or fitness centers must often be added. Some affordable-housing developers 
such as Rodney Fernandez of the Cabrillo Economic Development Corporation try to offer such 
amenities regardless of the income mix. “From a philosophical standpoint, we try to add as many 
amenities as possible, period. It provides a better quality of living for our residents. The fact that it is 
market rate has no bearing.”89  
 
Conclusion: While a mixed-income approach may be effective in building high-quality housing, 
community pressures may be as important as market pressures in holding the housing to a high 
development standard.  
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b. Goal: Maintain Developments to a High Standard 
Just as market pressure should cause mixed-income developments to be built to a high standard, it 
should force them to maintain the development to a high standard as well. For long-term maintenance 
to be of high quality, two conditions must be met:  
 
 
 
                                                          
Sufficient operating and replacement reserves, and 
Incentives for high quality maintenance. 
 
For many public housing authorities, the rents from tenants combined with a federal operating 
subsidy were insufficient to fully cover the costs of maintenance.90 Without adequate operating and 
replacement reserves, many developments fell into moderate or severe disrepair. While they often 
have more of a market-rate component than all-low-income developments, many mixed-income 
developments are equally dependent upon public subsidies. Thus, they both face the risk of reduced 
public subsidies in affecting operating reserves. Where they may differ is that all-low-income 
properties could present more physical stress on a property and require greater per unit operating 
costs. However, some studies suggest that there is no difference in maintenance costs.91 They also 
both face the risk of operating costs rising faster than their income-limited rents or the value of a 
Section 8 voucher. In the case of mixed-income developments, this risk may be offset by their ability 
to raise rents on the higher-income units. Conversely, the housing market may suffer a downturn and 
the reduced rents from the market-rate units will be insufficient to cover operating costs.  
 
Market-rate units in mixed-income developments present other unique risks. One concern is not just 
that the housing market may soften, but that a mixed-income development will have difficulty 
attracting higher-income tenants to live with lower-income tenants. It may be particularly difficult to 
do so at a rent that approaches the market level. Also, turnover in market-rate units is generally higher 
than in lower-income units, presenting greater vacancy losses.92 This is due to the greater demand for 
lower-priced units and limited options for low-income tenants. Some managers also report difficulties 
complying with the “next available unit” rule for developments funded with Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits. In developments with both market-rate and tax-credit units, managers must first fill 
vacant units with tax-credit-eligible tenants. This can cause vacancy losses in the market units. Jeanne 
Pinado of the Madison Park Development Corporation in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston 
asserts, “This can become a big drawback in a big project.”93  
 
Opinion appears divided over whether the risk of reduced federal subsidies or lost rents from the 
market units presents a greater risk. Bill Kargman of First Realty speaks of his experience, “Low-
income units present the risk. It puts a property in jeopardy if higher rents are needed. What if limited 
Section 8 rents are not high enough to cover costs?”94 Gregg Warren of DHIC in Raleigh, North 
Carolina, offers the opposite, “The risk is in the market rate. Funders and underwriters are most 
concerned about being able to rent the market-rate units.”95 A syndicator of Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits, Will Cooper, Jr., suggests that due to the inclusion of market-rate units, “The general 
perception in the market is that mixed-income properties do present greater risk to the investor.” 
Reflecting that perceived risk, he says that his company, WNC, generally underwrites rents for the 
market-rate units to the same rents as the tax-credit units, not to the higher predicted market rents. 
Ultimately though, he says there has been “no real difference” in performance between tax-credit 
90 Suchman, 1996. 
91 Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 2001. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Interview with Jeanne Pinado, July 23, 2002. 
94 Interview with Bill Kargman, July 22, 2002. 
95 Interview with Gregg Warren, July 11, 2002. 
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developments that include market-rate units and those that do not.96 Based on these differences of 
opinion and experience, it may only be safe to say that the financial situation of each development has 
more to do with the individual characteristics of the development than its mix of incomes. 
  
If the revenues are sufficient, will developers and property managers spend money to maintain a high 
quality of maintenance? Four factors are key to producing high-quality maintenance: (1) market 
pressures, (2) community pressures, (3) competence and internal standards of the owner and manager, 
and (4) government standards.97 Again, while there are no comprehensive surveys of the mixed-
income housing stock, nearly all of the mixed-income properties that have been documented appear to 
have high-quality maintenance. While most subsidized, all-low-income properties are in good condi-
tion, their record appears to be more inconsistent. Government standards and competent government 
administrators, along with competent and committed property managers, have succeeded in holding 
the vast majority of the nation’s affordable housing stock to a high standard of maintenance. 
 
The maintenance issues may sometimes be related to the motives of the developer. Bill Sullivan of 
Rocky Mountain Mutual Housing Association says that, “We have found that when buying [low-
income housing properties] from an institutional investor, we always have a lot of work to do. It 
seems that when properties are owned by REITs [Real Estate Investment Trusts], they really didn’t 
care.”98 Conversely, affordable developments owned by private, profit-motivated owners are often of 
the highest quality.99 Rachel Bratt points out, “There are good for-profits and bad ones, and good 
nonprofits and bad ones.”100 The variance in competence, standards and commitment of for-profit and 
nonprofit developers and local government administrators suggests that market pressures are the best 
guarantee of high-quality maintenance. 
 
As in the case of housing quality, pressure from the community can force developers to maintain their 
properties to a high standard. Providing high maintenance may be a necessary cost of doing repeat 
business in a community. However, maintenance can slowly decline over time, or can deteriorate 
quickly in the case of a change in ownership. Thus, while community pressure has an important role 
in ensuring high-quality maintenance, it still leaves some cause for concern.  
 
Conclusion: Disagreement exists over whether mixed-income developments present greater long-term 
financial risks. However, while affordable housing has generally been maintained well, market 
pressures appear to be the best set of incentives to maintain the development to a high standard.  
 
 
3. Driver of Policy: Shortage of Affordable Housing 
Can a mixed-income approach produce more units by making more effective use of existing public 
funds, build support for more public funds, and overcome local obstacles to affordable housing? 
 
                                                          
96 E-mail exchange with Will Cooper, Jr. 
97 Comments by Charlie Wilkins, August 26, 2002. 
98 Interview with Bill Sullivan, July 26, 2002. 
99 The Brandywyne Village development owned and managed by First Realty Management Corporation won 
the Community of Quality Award for Exemplary Family Property from the National Affordable Housing 
Management Association in 2000.  
100 Interview with Rachel Bratt, August 7, 2002. 
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a. Goal: Develop Units With Less Public Subsidy 
The overall decline in public funding for development of affordable housing places pressure upon 
policymakers and mission-based developers to find ways to build housing in a cost-effective manner. 
Mixed-income housing is proposed as one means of building more affordable housing with a reduced 
outlay of public subsidy.  
 
In theory, the rents or sales from higher-income units can be used to cross-subsidize the lower-income 
units, reducing the subsidy needed. This can take place through a variety of financing programs and 
mechanisms. However, it generally requires a very tight housing market to achieve the high rents 
needed for cross-subsidization. There are probably only a limited number of markets where cross-
subsidization can be accomplished consistently. Terry Goddard, former mayor of Phoenix, Arizona, 
suggested, “Mixed-income housing is probably a myth outside of New York, San Francisco and 
Boston.”101  
 
In some of the tighter markets, such as New York City and Massachusetts, mixed-income housing-
finance programs have been in place for years and have funded numerous developments. However, 
the number of developments that can be funded with a greatly reduced public subsidy and that heavily 
utilize a cross-subsidy are limited even in these tight markets. For example, the New York City 
Housing Partnership’s 80/20 program offers low-cost, tax-exempt financing to lure developers to 
build developments that reserve 20 percent of the units for households with incomes below 50 percent 
of AMI. Because low-cost financing is the primary subsidy, the cross-subsidy is relied upon to help 
finance the lower-income units. But even in New York, one of the nation’s tightest housing markets, 
this program only funds about two developments a year, and there are probably not enough potential 
sites to do more.102 A sensitivity analysis of a potential mixed-income development in the Boston 
suburbs reflects the limits of utilizing a shallow subsidy. The analysis found that if the number of 
low-income units were increased slightly from 20 to 25 percent, the return to the developer would be 
insufficient to justify the development.103 Thus if a large reduction in the public subsidy required is a 
high-priority goal, it can probably only be accomplished in developments with a small number of 
low-income units.  
 
Recognizing the production limits of its 80/20 program, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
sought to expand production through the State Housing Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP) 
program in 1983. In addition to offering low-cost financing of five percent, MHFA also offered 
operating subsidies that were structured as loans. As designed, these loans would be repaid as the 
rents rose and the need for operating subsidies was phased out. In return, developers were to reserve 
25 percent of the units for tenants whose incomes qualify them for public housing. In one sense, the 
program was phenomenally successful, spurring development that dwarfed that of the 80/20 program. 
In a span of seven years, 82 projects were built, consisting of 9,350 total units and 3,131 low-income 
units.104 However, certain assumptions, particularly that of continued growth in market rents, proved 
unrealistic and led to a need to restructure the financial terms for a majority of the developments. The 
problem with the program, according to former MHFA director Marvin Siflinger, was that when the 
economy and housing market softened, MHFA could not use its savings from refinancing under lower 
interest rates to offer additional subsidies to the developments. His advice for future programs is to 
“Make sure that annual subsidy appropriation is linked to the status of the economy.”105 A reason so 
many units were built, and also that the program encountered financial difficulties, was that 
                                                          
101 Interview with Terry Goddard, August 2, 2002. 
102 Interview with Joan Tally, July 22, 2002. 
103 Adnani and Crabtree, 2000. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Interview with Marvin Siflinger, July 23, 2002. 
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developers had to invest very little equity, and since they did not have to repay the loans if rents did 
not increase as expected, they bore little financial risk. If rents had risen as predicted, the program 
may have been able to achieve some level of cross-subsidization, but developers were guaranteed a 
strong return regardless of the increase in rents. Thus, a note of caution about developments that rely 
upon cross-subsidization is that they are only as strong as the markets and the economies in which 
they operate.  
 
Based on these experiences, the degree to which these programs are actually achieving a cross-
subsidy must be questioned. First, because the entire development receives the benefit of reduced 
financing costs, a shallow subsidy to the whole development might better be thought of as a deep 
subsidy to only the affordable units. For example, in a 100-unit development, a two-percent reduction 
in the interest rate on a loan, say from ten percent to eight percent, has the same effect as offering a 
zero-percent interest rate to only the 20 low-income units. Developers also often use additional 
financing sources such as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit to subsidize development costs, and 
tenants may use Section 8 vouchers to subsidize operating costs.106 Thus the total subsidy per low-
income unit may be comparable to that of developments without market-rate units. More generally, 
for-profit developers must receive a subsidy at least equal to, if not greater than, the revenue lost 
through the reduced rents for the low-income units, to give them the incentive to serve a low-income 
population. This fact alone suggests that cross-subsidization of low-income units is unlikely to occur 
in developments constructed by for-profit developers. As seen in the SHARP program, developers 
were eager to participate in a cross-subsidization program when their return was guaranteed, but 
would be far less likely to use such a program if more of the risk was shifted to them. 
 
Programs such as the Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program in Montgomery County, Maryland, 
or the Local Initiative program in Massachusetts encourage the construction of affordable units with 
little financial subsidy for the housing. However, that is not to say the programs are not without pub-
lic subsidies. In the case of Montgomery County, the developments are awarded additional density 
allowances beyond that permitted by local zoning regulations. In Massachusetts, developers who 
include affordable units are allowed to circumvent local zoning hearings. Such provisions may 
impose costs that are difficult to calculate, such as less shade from a taller building, or more traffic. 
By increasing the number of families in one area, these provision may also result in more direct 
public expenditures, such as the cost of providing education for additional children.  
 
Cross-subsidization is more likely to occur for nonprofit developers who have a lower financial return 
threshold. For example, while a for-profit developer requires a 15 percent annual return on the invest-
ment, a nonprofit developer may only require a five percent return to cover organizational costs.107 If 
the market-rate units in a development in a transitional area produce a ten percent return, this return 
would be less then what is necessary to induce a for-profit developer to build there. However, for a 
nonprofit developer the excess five percent return from the market-rate developments could be used 
to help offset the debt service or operating costs of the low-income units. Some developers, such as 
Cabrillo Economic Development Corporation, report that the rents in their locale of Ventura County, 
California, are high enough to achieve some level of cross-subsidization. However, the markets in 
which cross-subsidization can occur are limited. Home-ownership developments may provide a less 
risky means of cross-subsidization for nonprofits since the gains can be recaptured immediately.  
 
A more common scenario in mixed-income developments appears to be a cross-subsidy from the low-
income units to the market units. One way this cross-subsidization can occur is when the value of 
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Section 8 vouchers is greater than the rent that can be charged for a true market-rate unit. For 
example, a mixed-income development in a low-income neighborhood in the South Bronx could only 
charge about $700 for market-rate units, while the value of the Section 8 certificates was $920.108 In 
other instances, development subsidies can be used to partially fund the construction of market-rate 
units that would otherwise not be financially feasible.109 Finally, including market-rate units can shift 
the sources of financing, costing localities more. Rodney Fernandez describes a development he 
proposed to the city of Saticoy, California, as a 100-percent low-income project, financed with Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit equity. When the city stipulated that market-rate units be included, the 
new funding structure required a $1.2 million contribution from the city that was not needed before, 
and the Cabrillo Economic Development Corporation had to invest additional equity.110 In many 
developments, such as Harbor Point in Boston and Lake Parc Place in Chicago, low-ceiling rents 
were needed to attract higher-income tenants to live in the development.111 Amenities such as a 
swimming pool, tennis courts, fitness center and free parking were added at Harbor Point and can be 
found at many other developments as a means of attracting higher-income tenants. While they can be 
financed more cost-effectively for larger developments, they still add extra costs. When the below-
market rents and extra amenities are included, mixed-income developments can sometimes cost more 
per low-income unit than comparable all-low-income developments.  
 
Even if they do not impose additional costs, mixed-income developments are almost always more 
complicated to finance. Diane Suchman asserts, “As a general rule, mixed-income housing cannot be 
financed successfully using conventional financing models and funding sources. Instead, the 
financing typically involves piecing together funds from a number of public and private sources.”112 
While complexity is a barrier that can certainly be overcome, it was cited in discussions with 
developers as an issue, particularly in using certain programs such as the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit. In addition, mixed-income developments can sometimes pose additional financial risks, as 
discussed in the preceding section. Thus, even when cross-subsidization from market-rate units to 
low-income units is feasible, complexity and risk of the financing may limit the number of additional 
affordable units that can be developed under a mixed-income model. 
 
Conclusion: The ability of mixed-income developments to reduce the public subsidies needed for the 
production of low-income units is critically dependent upon the strength of local housing markets. 
Even in very tight markets, only developers with low return thresholds are likely to use market rents 
to cross-subsidize low-income units. The cost of public subsidies may actually be higher for mixed-
income developments in some markets. 
 
b. Goal: Assuage Community Concerns Over Affordable Housing 
Even with sufficient funding, community objections can keep proposed affordable-housing develop-
ments from ever being built. Can including a mix of incomes so that a development does not serve 
exclusively low-income households be effective in overcoming such objections? Developers 
interviewed in both high- and low-income communities suggest that the answer is yes.  
 
They also suggest that including a mix of incomes may not only be effective, but necessary to gain 
approval in their communities. Jeanne Pinado suggests that for developments in the Roxbury neigh-
borhood of Boston, “Mixed-income is almost the rule now.”113 Clearly this is not the case in all 
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communities, as mixed-income housing is still more the exception than the rule. However, in low-
poverty communities that may be the most desirable place to develop low-income housing, it may be 
nearly impossible to attain approval without a mix of incomes.  
 
Michael Pyatok offers a more hopeful view and a strategy for gaining community approval of all low-
income developments:  
 
It is important to demonstrate the work of the architect and policies of the management company. 
Provide assurances that it will be high-quality housing with a tightly controlled management 
policy, and allow community members to be on the board of the housing development. These 
strategies can allay fears in lower-income neighborhoods. It is harder to gain approval in a 
middle-income neighborhood. But even there, a good architect and management company can 
win them over. Another way is to work through faith-based channels. Find out where all of the 
synagogues, mosques and churches are, and talk to them and get them on board. See if they can 
sponsor a meeting. By gradually working through this channel, you get to reach out to the 
community leadership who can then call a major public meeting.114 
 
Even with this investment of time, a commitment to quality, and outreach to build community sup-
port, it is difficult to overcome deep-rooted fears about the effects of low-income housing and its 
residents.  
 
A serious downside to this approach, however, is that it can result in the production of fewer units of 
affordable housing. If a 100-unit, all-low-income development was proposed, but following negoti-
ations with the city, only half of the units were affordable, that means 50 fewer units. Perhaps zero 
units would have been built without including a mix of incomes, but the loss of potential units in a 
mixed-income development is an important consideration. While the public subsidies per unit may 
remain constant, valuable time and land are expended. Nonprofits in particular have limited staff and 
resources to expend, and may be fortunate to complete one deal per year. Marianne Garvin of CDC of 
Long Island in Centereach, New York, comments that, “It is very difficult to get zoning and site plans 
approved, and we don’t want to squander it on regular market-rate housing.” Particularly in stable, 
diverse communities that may be the most attractive location to site affordable-housing developments, 
the number of potential locations may be very limited. Rodney Fernandez adds, “Vacant parcels in 
many of our neighborhoods are at a premium.”115 
 
Even more pressing is the loss of current units in a mixed-income model. While some HOPE VI 
redevelopments have pledged to rebuild an affordable unit for each that is demolished, others have 
only rebuilt one-third of the public-housing units they demolished. Families who are displaced 
through the demolition are offered Section 8 vouchers that in many tight housing markets may be 
difficult to use, or limit them to housing far from the central city.116 
 
Conclusion: Including a mix of incomes appears to be an effective strategy in overcoming community 
objections to affordable housing, and may be a necessary strategy in many communities. However, it 
may result in fewer needy families being served in the most desirable developments or locations. 
 
                                                          
114 Interview with Michael Pyatok, July 26, 2002. 
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116 The national average for successful use of a Section 8 voucher fell from 81 percent in 1993 to 69 percent in 
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c. Goal: Build a Political Constituency for Affordable Housing 
While it is a longer-term goal, and is not a high priority for any individual development, mixed-
income housing may be effective in building a political constituency for affordable housing. The high 
quality found in mixed-income developments as well as the higher range of incomes may help to 
create more favorable impressions of affordable housing. This could result in both more funding for 
affordable housing and more willingness among communities to allow affordable housing to be built 
in their area. 
 
While it is too early to speculate on the prospects of building such a constituency, recent develop-
ments suggest that it can be built. First, more Americans, and Americans of higher incomes, have 
become concerned about the affordability of housing as prices have jumped in recent years. A recent 
poll shows that a lack of affordable housing is the top-priority issue for 41 percent of working-class 
families, defined as having incomes up to $54,000.117This creates an opportunity to link support for 
those with the greatest needs to those with more moderate needs. In an era of federal deficits, 
however, support for those with higher incomes could come at the cost, rather than in addition to, 
support for very-low-income households.  
 
One prominent organization, the National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), is trying to build 
a broad-based coalition in support of additional funding for low-income housing. Its National 
Housing Trust Fund Campaign has received 3,000 endorsements and has helped introduce legislation 
in the House and Senate. A recent poll conducted by NHLIC also shows support for new housing 
initiatives, including that 66 percent of likely voters support the creation of National Housing Trust 
Fund, and that 52 percent believe that increased spending to make sure that low-income people have 
affordable housing is more important than cutting taxes.118 The recent increase in funding for the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit also shows that Congress is willing to fund housing that is generally of 
good quality and lacks the social problems of prior federally funded housing developments.119 
However, the tax credit program has met these objectives and received additional funding without a 
significant mix of incomes in most of its developments.120 The role of developers in advocating for 
additional resources to fund the construction of low- and moderate-income should be noted as well. 
 
Conclusion: Mixed-income developments may be helpful in building a political constituency, but may 
not be necessary to meet that goal. The development of well-managed, high-quality affordable hous-
ing developments, regardless of income mix, may be most important to overcoming the long-standing 
negative perceptions of public housing and other “failed” housing approaches. 
 
Summary 
While the evidence is far from conclusive, mixed-income housing appears be effective in meeting 
most of its goals. A notable exception is in offering additional life chances. More research is clearly 
needed in this area. Whether or not a mix of incomes is needed or responsible for many of these goals 
is far more ambiguous. Table 5 below summarizes the findings of mixed-income housing’s success in 
meeting its various goals. 
 
                                                          
117 Pierce, 2002. 
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Table 5. Achievements of a Mixed-Income Approach 
Goal Effective in Achieving Goal Necessary to Achieve Goal 
Manage Negative 
Behavior 
Crime and vandalism appear to be 
minimal in mixed-income developments. 
Strict screening and management are more 
responsible for reducing negative behavior 
than a mix of incomes. 
Improve Life 
Chances 
There is little evidence so far that low-
income tenants improve their life chances 
in mixed-income developments.  
Social services and location are more 
important in promoting upward mobility 
of low-income tenants. 
Rebuild Healthy 
Communities 
Mixed-income developments, particularly 
large scale HOPE VI projects, have a 
positive impact in revitalizing distressed 
neighborhoods. 
Including a mix of incomes is more 
important in large-scale developments to 
rebuild communities. 
High-Quality 
Units 
Mixed-income developments generally 
have high-quality units. 
Community pressure appears to be equally 
important to ensuring high quality. 
High-Quality 
Maintenance 
Mixed-income developments generally 
have high-quality maintenance. 
Community pressure appears to be equally 
important to ensuring high quality. 
Develop Units 
With Less Subsidy 
Cross-subsidization is generally possible 
only in tight housing markets, and for 
nonprofit developers. Mixed-income 
developments can also lead to higher 
costs. 
While cross-subsidization is limited, a mix 
of incomes is necessary to achieve this 
goal.  
Assuage 
Community 
Concerns 
Including a mix of incomes is often 
effective in overcoming community 
objections.  
A mix of incomes may be necessary to 
overcome objections in many 
communities. 
Build Political 
Constituency 
Serving a range of incomes may be 
necessary to build a constituency, but 
mixed-income’s role in building a political 
constituency is unclear.  
The necessity of mixed-income develop-
ments to building political support is also 
unclear.  
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V. KEY IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS 
The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify the reasons and motivations for adopting a mixed-
income approach to developing affordable housing, and to offer an initial assessment of its progress 
in meeting its goals. An absolute verdict cannot yet be offered on the effectiveness or necessity of a 
mixed-income approach. However, several key implications and notes of caution have emerged over 
the course of this research that are emphasized below. In addition, a checklist of questions is offered 
to guide policymakers and practitioners evaluating the merit of a mixed-income approach.  
 
Key Implications 
 
1. There Is No Silver Bullet for Solving Housing Affordability or Poverty 
A mixed-income approach to affordable housing is not a “silver bullet” to address either the nation’s 
affordable-housing problem or the nation’s poverty problem.121 On the housing side, mixed-income 
development appears to be effective in producing high-quality housing, overcoming community 
barriers, and — in limited instances — producing housing more cost-effectively. In regard to 
alleviating poverty, mixed-income’s effects appear limited at best. Low-income families face serious 
barriers in the form of limited education, poor local schools for one’s children, a lack of employment 
opportunities and racism. Large concentrations of poverty are clearly detrimental and add an extra 
layer to these barriers, but there is little evidence thus far demonstrating positive social benefits for 
low-income households living in mixed-income developments per se. Because this is a key 
motivation behind mixed-income developments, more research is necessary to better document the 
effects. However, many mixed-income developments serve either very few or no extremely low-
income families who have the worst-case housing needs and face the greatest obstacles to overcoming 
poverty. Thus, in many cases, mixed-income developments are not serving the group that would have 
the most to gain from this approach’s potential advantages. 
 
2. Healthy Communities Are Needed to Address Poverty 
Affordable housing can play a significant role in alleviating poverty, beyond reducing rent burdens. 
Housing located in healthy communities can reduce the effects of concentrations of poverty, offer a 
safer living environment, offer proximity to transportation and employment opportunities, link house-
holds with social services, offer access to better schools, and connect families to a broader range of 
people and institutions. In sum, housing in a healthy community generally offers a more stable plat-
form for moving out of poverty. There is nothing inherent in mixed-income developments that links 
households to these important factors that can alleviate poverty. Therefore, housing developers and 
policymakers need to consider factors beyond a single development in addressing housing and 
poverty problems in this country. While mixed-income housing is one key strategy in linking 
households to these needed elements, it is only one factor among many needed to address the 
complex problem of poverty. 
 
3. Mixed-Income Housing Can Have a Role in Alleviating Poverty 
While community-specific advantages deserve more attention in using housing to alleviate poverty, 
mixed-income housing can play an important role in helping residents access these advantages. The 
strategy can overcome barriers to allow low-income families to live in communities with these 
                                                          
121 Schwartz and Tajbakhsh reach a similarly worded conclusion in Mixed-Income Housing as Social Policy: 
The Case for Diminished Expectations, 2002. 
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advantages; it can help to attract higher-income families to redevelop a transitional community; and it 
can have a role in deconcentrating poverty within very large developments. Furthermore, it ensures a 
mix of incomes in a development over time, helping to retain a mix of incomes within a larger 
community. Policymakers and developers should be cautioned that the mixed-income approach can 
have negative effects on low-income families as well. Depending on the mix of incomes chosen, 
extremely low-income families are often priced out of the affordable housing. In addition, services for 
low-income individuals can be harder and less efficient to provide in the deconcentrated model, as 
providers have to stretch their resources to reach all needy people.  
 
4. Different Populations Mean Different Goals 
“Poor” people’s needs are very different, depending on such factors as income and education. 
Chronic poverty is often associated with other problems beyond a low income, and a stronger case 
can be made for mixing incomes and deconcentrating families with the lowest incomes and most 
barriers to steady employment. For families with steady employment, the focus should be first and 
foremost on meeting their housing needs. Furthermore, these considerations should be taken into 
account when designing and evaluating developments serving different income groups. 
  
5. The Mixed-Income Approach Presents Unique Challenges 
The mixed-income housing approach presents unique challenges. The financing almost always 
appears to be more complex, it can be riskier, and ultimately it can be more costly. Some developers 
report that mixed-income developments are nearly impossible to finance using existing financing 
tools in their geographic areas. A mixed-income development can also present unique managing and 
marketing challenges. These challenges can be overcome, but they require extra knowledge, effort 
and dedication to make the development successful. 
 
6. The Bottom Line: Meeting the Nation’s Greatest Housing Needs 
The commonly levied critique of mixed-income housing is that it results in fewer needy families 
being served. HOPE VI developments often replace only a fraction of the public-housing units 
demolished; recent public-housing laws allow preference to be given to higher-income families; and 
the mix of many private developments limits the number of low-income families that can live in that 
location. An effort to balance the mix of incomes can also result not only in fewer units for low-
income families, but fewer units for the extremely low-income families who comprise two-thirds of 
households with severe housing burdens. Mixed-income housing, by reducing subsidies and over-
coming political barriers, can help to get more units of affordable housing built. This approach also 
places a high priority on the quality, location and social ramifications of the housing development. 
These considerations should be at the core of every affordable-housing development, but caution 
must be exercised that they do not overshadow the top priority of any housing policy: helping 
families with the greatest housing needs. 
 
Key Questions: Getting to Mixed Income 
The following is checklist of considerations in deciding if a mixed-income development is needed or 
desirable.  
 
What is the market? The starting point for any development is the market, and for mixed-
income developments it is particularly important. Attracting moderate- or high-income house-
holds, particularly into a rental development, may not be possible in many markets. 
 
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Who is being served in a development? If the housing is for an extremely low-income popula-
tion, there may be a stronger case for a mix of incomes. A mix of incomes may be necessary even 
within this group to ensure that not all of the tenants are nonworking or have serious social 
service needs that could overwhelm the social-service provision and management capacity of the 
development. Conversely, a development might also be specifically designed to efficiently help a 
population with serious social-service needs, such as formerly homeless individuals. Focusing on 
a mix of incomes may ultimately detract from meeting the goal of assisting families who truly 
need housing assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the tenure type? The tenure type (rental, home-ownership or cooperative) is determined 
in large part by the population and market being served. Home-ownership units may eventually 
become unaffordable as these homes appreciate in value, making the initial mix of incomes in a 
development a temporary phenomenon. In contrast, a mixed-income rental development remains 
generally remains affordable to low-income households for at least 20 years, if not the life of the 
development. Thus, a mixed-income rental development may help to maintain a mix of incomes 
within a community over a longer period.  
 
What is the scale? As developments take on a larger scale, the need for a mix of incomes seems 
to grow. Creating a mix of incomes in small developments may create needless marketing and 
management challenges. 
 
What is the greater community context? Large-scale, all-very-low-income developments will 
always pose problems. Yet the need to provide a mix of incomes within one development appears 
to decline, particularly in a small development in a community that already has a mix of higher-
income households. Conversely, mixed-income housing in a distressed neighborhood might be 
part of a larger revitalization strategy. 
 
What are the financial considerations? In limited instances, a mixed-income approach can 
reduce the subsidy needed and provide financial stability, particularly in tight markets. However, 
a mixed-income approach will also require that the lower-income units are built to a very high 
standard, and it will require that those units fit into the neighborhood. Both are desirable, but 
come at a cost. Moreover, if the wrong mix is attempted, the property might actually fail. In 
others it can increase the risk and cost of the development. Accordingly, mixed-income housing 
should be pursued carefully, with good analysis of the market, neighborhood, costs and potential 
benefits. 
 
Is a mix of incomes necessary for approval? Even if all of the preceding factors suggest that a 
mix of incomes is not necessary for a successful development, city regulations or community 
objections may require that higher-income households be included. 
 
What defines success? Any housing development represents the push and pull of a variety of 
factors, most notably financial realities and community concerns. However, the final product may 
serve far fewer needy families than the original vision, and in some cases at a higher cost. Thus, it 
is important to begin the process with a definition of what will meet the threshold for a successful 
development. While a public subsidy may be reallocated to another development, time, land and 
equity are all scarce inputs. If a sufficient number of families is not being served, the investment 
should be reconsidered. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Housing policy in the U.S. often seems torn over whether housing is a physical good or a social good. 
Are other factors so ingrained in where and how we live that building good-quality, safe housing is 
never enough of an accomplishment in itself? Mixed-income housing, perhaps more than any other 
housing policy, embodies this debate. It seeks to build more high-quality, affordable housing while 
also pursuing ambitious social goals of alleviating the effects of concentrations of poverty. 
 
It is this confluence of physical and social benefits that makes mixed-income housing such an 
appealing approach. However, while more research into this topic is clearly needed, it is probably fair 
to say that the mixed-income approach has a varied record of success in accomplishing its goals. Its 
clearest success seems to be in alleviating community objections to low-income housing, while the 
most questionable results are in achieving positive social or economic gains for low-income families 
through interaction with their higher-income neighbors. Also, while a mixed-income approach offers 
potential benefits, it also presents additional costs and risks. Furthermore, in many situations the 
benefits offered by mixed-income housing might be achieved in developments without a significant 
mix of incomes. 
 
History has shown that concentrating large numbers of very poor households in one area is a destruc-
tive policy that is to be avoided at all costs. Yet it does not follow that housing tenants with a signifi-
cant mix of incomes within a development is universally the best policy either. A careful considera-
tion of the population being served, community and financing objectives is needed to determine the 
best approach. Ultimately, a mixed-income approach is one tool among many for addressing the 
housing needs of low-income families and building healthy communities. It is an effective tool in 
some situations and inappropriate in others.  
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